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Carlo Pelloso
The Myth of the Priority of Procedure over Substance 
in the Light of Early Greek Epos* 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction: is the chronological and logical priority of procedure over substance 
just a myth? – 2. Supporting the priority of procedure over substance: divine and human 
judgments, dispute-settlements by arbitral awards, justice as a process. – 3. Some pre-
liminary general criticisms. – 4. The killer, the dead and the divine thief: d…kh and legal 
procedure. – 5. D…kh beyond the trial: litigious scenarios and non-contentious contexts 
– 6. ‘Stating the straightest d…kh’; ‘selecting rules for straight d…kai’; d…kh as a ‘personal 
sphere’; d…kh as a ‘principle’. – 7. On a recent critical review. – Bibliography. 
1. Introduction: is the chronological and logical priority of procedure 
 over substance just a myth?
In a remarkable – albeit not fully convincing – monograph about the role 
played by substantive law and, above all, legal procedure1 in ancient and mod-
* This essay is based on two speeches: the ﬁrst one – with the title The concept of d…kh in 
archaic Greek epos – was held in Athens on the 6th of September 2012 during the ‘Third Inter-
national Meeting of Young Historians of Ancient Greek Law’; the second one – as a research 
seminar on Legal procedures and substantive positions in the Homeric poems – was held in 
Edinburgh, at the School of History, Classics and Archaeology, on the 10th of December 2013.
1 On this divide, see, paradigmatically, KERLEY, HAMES, SUKYS, 2011, p. 6 f.: «a substantive 
law is one that creates, deﬁnes, or explains what our rights are. An example of a substantive 
civil law is the federal law making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any indi-
vidual because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The law also provides 
that if an employer is found to have engaged in such activities, that employer is liable to the 
employee for money damages. This law creates certain rights for employees who have suf-
fered job discrimination. Substantive civil laws include such areas as contracts, real estate and 
construction, commercial and business transactions, intellectual property, and consumer rights. 
One of the most common areas of substantive law resulting in litigation is the area of tort law, 
especially the tort of negligence. This area, often referred to as personal injury litigation, in-
cludes lawsuits stemming from automobile accidents, injuries occurring on another’s property, 
and professional malpractice. Many other areas of tort law also result in litigation: for example, 
product liability, inﬂiction of emotional distress, and defamation»; «the law of civil litigation is 
primarily procedural law. Procedural law sets forth the methods we use to enforce our rights. Pro-
cedural law answers questions such as these: What court should an action be ﬁled in? What types 
of documents should be ﬁled? What are the technical requirements for documents ﬁled in court? 
How must the defendant be notiﬁed of the lawsuit? What are the time requirements for the various 
procedures?». See, moreover, for a more ‘iconic’ description, SALMOND, 1913, p. 438: «substan-
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ern literature, the Belgian philosopher François Ost wrote that it is not forbid-
den to think – and, indeed, legal historians would urge to do so – that the judge 
was the original key player in the western world’s legal scenario, earlier than 
the law-maker and far earlier than the administrator2. Ost’s idea has the ad-
vantage of not being clear-cut: in fact, ‘it is not forbidden’ does not mean ‘it is 
necessary’; it means instead ‘it is possible’. My aim in this work is to analyze 
the grounds of this possibility. My question is: can we agree that law, in the 
objective sense and also with regard to ancient Greece, was born as judge-
made law, that is to say law made during a trial as a resolution of a speciﬁc and 
concrete case, which then settles into a general and abstract principle, only 
through the stratiﬁcation of repeated judgments (judicial praxis) or through 
the stare decisis principle (binding precedent)? Is it correct to think that, also 
in ancient Greece, the idea of ‘action’ logically and chronologically precedes 
the idea of ‘substantive subjective position’ (ﬁrst of all rights and duties), thus 
justifying – in terms of historical continuity – the alleged predominance of the 
procedural perspective in the Athenian legal and logographic settings? If the his-
torian – according to Bloch – is like an ogre, who can smell fresh meat, the legal 
historian – I add – knows the instruments to dispose of the rotten meat he is deliv-
ered. And this issue has a smell that the legal historian cannot underrate.
Usually the answer to such questions is yes, give or take a few provisos, 
and this approach supports the theory of the judicial origins of law and that 
of the priority of action. From the point of view of a macro-comparison be-
tween ancient legal systems, this also reduces the gap between the Greek legal 
experience and Roman law, at least according to the latter’s traditional under-
standing3. On the contrary, in accordance with the basic scepticism evidenced 
by Raphael Sealey, indeed, «law in its most comprehensive scope can be re-
garded in each of two ways. On the one hand it is a system of rights, and ac-
tions are the ‘instruments’ devised to uphold them. On the other, it is a system 
tive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law 
deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates 
the conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former deter-
mines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated. Procedural law is concerned 
with affairs inside the courts of justice; substantive law with matters in the world outside».
2 OST, 2004.
3 Such an understanding can be considered as obsolete: indeed many scholars had inter-
preted the prudentes’ legal thought by applying to it current categories, that is categories which 
are often insufﬁcient to appreciate the primeval monism that merged together substance and 
procedure in a single concept: actio. Thence, it seems to me better to assume that «der oft 
wiederholte Satz ‘Die Klassiker behandeln des Privatrecht von Standpunk des Prozesses ist 
ungenau’», since Roman legal science is not «prozeßrechtlich orientiert, sondern aktionenre-
chtlich» (SCHULZ, 1934, p. 28 f.): on this topic, see PELLOSO, 2011, with further bibliography, 
analysis of the Roman sources, and wider and further argumentation.
(2) www.rivistadirittoellenico.it 
RDE 3-2013 14 dic 14.indd   224 14/12/2014   16.42.36
R ED
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO ELLENICO
ARTICOLI
III/2013
 The Myth of the Priority of Procedure over Substance 225
of actions, and when an action is made available, it generates a right. On the 
whole, the former view is modern and the other is Roman. Yet the difference 
is only one of emphasis. The question of the relative priority of procedural 
and substantive law is ultimately a chicken-and-egg question»4. These words 
describe the issue of the relationship between substantive law and procedural 
law, where substance and procedure are considered as two interchangeable 
perspectives for the analysis of a legal system. On the one hand, while dis-
missing the problem of the historical and logical priority of action over sub-
jective legal situations, the scholar declines to take a stance on the features of 
the most ancient Hellenic legal experience, as reconstructed on the basis of 
Homer’s poems: in his opinion, while it is true that Homer recognises «d…kh 
in a procedural sense», it is equally true that «d…kh in the Homeric poems can 
have a substantive sense»5. On the other hand, he postulates the conceptual 
homogeneity between the perspective view that identiﬁes ‘objective law’ in 
‘forms of actions’ and the determination of ‘objective law’ through its sub-
stantive contents: thus, the categories of ‘action’ and of ‘substantive right’ 
become purely formal issues of point of view and methodology; they just 
seem to be provisional diatheses of legal problems and of relevant solutions, 
justiﬁed only in terms of contingent preferences, not the sign of fundamentally 
different formae mentis.
While Sealey adopts a banalizing attitude with regard to the categories 
at the basis of legal thought (and for this reason his argument is less than 
convincing), many other scholars have maintained a less cautious approach, 
4 SEALEY, 1994, p. 138 f. (see GAGARIN, 1994, p. 276 ff., on Sealey’s ambiguous use of ‘jus-
tice’ instead of ‘law in action’). Such an approach resembles Talamanca’s one with regard to 
the Roman system: the scholar, once remarked the common opinion that «nella prospettiva dei 
Romani prevalesse una visione processuale dell’ordinamento, onde la concessione dell’azio-
ne sarebbe il prius rispetto alla conﬁgurazione della situazione giuridica sostanziale protetta; 
mentre nella visione moderna ispirata al diritto sostanziale, avverrebbe proprio il contrario», 
maintains that «in effetti, non v’è una differenza essenziale: l’individuazione di una situazione 
giuridica sostanziale comporta sempre, per l’indefettibile coercibilità del diritto, l’esistenza di 
una protezione giudiziaria di tale situazione; e quando s’identiﬁca un mezzo di tutela proces-
suale, contemporaneamente si è individuata la situazione sostanziale in base alla quale esso può 
venire esperito», so that «la concettualizzazione può assumere … come prioritario l’uno o l’al-
tro aspetto, ma essi sono inscindibili» (TALAMANCA, 1989, p. 151 f.; for some arguments against 
this conception, see PELLOSO, 2011). On the contrary, it is true that «if laws were concerned 
mainly with procedure, then the aim of the legal system was simply to resolve disputes among 
individuals», while, «if laws provided clear and numerous substantive norms, that is, orders 
setting out rights and duties, our view of the legal system changes radically. Laws no longer 
restrict their aim to providing rules for procedure in court, but extend their sphere to all aspects 
of life in the community. They prescribe the duties of citizens and ofﬁcials, provide regulations 
about economic life, establish rules about marriage and inheritance, restrict or outlaw the use of 
violence, and contain orders about religious rites and festivals» (HARRIS, 2009-2010, p. 8 f.).
5 SEALEY, 1994, p. 138 f.
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mainly arguing about Athenian law, with regard to the ﬁrst issue (which Sea-
ley left virtually unresolved); instead, with regard to the second issue, even 
accepting the conceptual antithesis between the procedural and the substan-
tive approach, their solutions are, at best, rough. For instance, Todd and Millet 
supported «a chronological and logical priority for procedural law»6, while 
Todd alone manifested a total disregard for the characteristics of the Roman 
legal experience and stated that «the priority of procedure over substance 
is characteristic of those societies in which theory remains latent» and that 
«where there are no jurists, law is formulated only to ﬁt situations, and the 
primary concern is to enable a case to be heard, rather than to promote the 
autonomous development of legal doctrines», concluding in favour of «the 
procedural orientation of Athenian Law»7. 
It is true that these two aspects can be interpreted, more or less explicitly, in 
the light of historical continuity and therefore can be included in a cause-effect 
relationship: the chronological antecedent and the logical foundation (which, 
until the recent critique by Harris, had been considered an incontrovertible fact 
for the Athenian system)8 should be found in the Homeric ‘beginnings’ of the 
Greek legal experience. Harris has already convincingly demonstrated that the 
communis opinio, which maintains the (logical) priority and the (statistical) 
prevalence of procedure, is a myth without any foundation in Athenian sources9: 
very probably the Roman ‘aktionenrechtliches Denken’ has been a priori, if 
not intentionally, extended to the Greek world, and the Greek ‘otherness’ has 
been taken too lightly compared to the present legal culture and the past ones. 
This paper, therefore, is not aimed at expressing an opinion on the substance of 
the traditional interpretations based on the analysis of the logographic and epi-
graphic sources of the Classical era. It starts from the Homeric verses, where the 
primal concept of d…kh emerges, convinced that this very concept can help us 
retrospectively understand the issue of law for the Greeks10; this work shall test 
the thesis that, in the Greek legal experience as a whole, the most ancient law 
is created only within a trial, as well as the thesis – which originates by virtue 
and as a consequence of the ﬁrst, prejudicial conviction – that denies that the 
organisation of (objective) law that occurred in later historical eras, which are 
however connected with the origins, be «according to content»11.
6 TODD, MILLETT, 1990, p. 5.
7 TODD, 1993, p. 65; see, moreover, TODD, 2000; 2005, p. 98; cf. HANSEN, 1975, p. 10, 14, 21; 
1991, p. 165; COHEN, 1995, p. 152, 190; CAREY, 1996, p. 41; FOXHALL, LEWIS, 1996, p. 3.
8 HARRIS, 2009-2010.
9 See the great amount of passages in the logographic speeches quoted in HARRIS, 2009-
2010, p. 41 f.
10 See, for a similar approach, BISCARDI, 1982, p. 351.
11 HANSEN, 1991, p. 165.
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2. Supporting the priority of procedure over substance: divine and human
 judgments, dispute-settlements by arbitral awards, justice as a process.
Regardless of the approach adopted to tackle the issue (anthropological, 
sociological, etymological, historical-legal), the judicial theory of the law’s 
beginnings and the chronological priority of procedure over substance is not 
a recent one. Indeed, the following alternative statements seem to be true in a 
general sense: 1) on the one hand, one can consider law as a relatively compact 
system, that differentiates between the recipients of the rules (for instance: the 
members of a family group; the members of the community at large), or be-
tween the sources of the rules (for instance: the king’s will expressed in a gen-
eral and abstract way or formulated for a single case; the customs; the popular 
resolutions and decrees), not considering its actually historical origins; 2) on 
the other hand, one can assume that the instruments for dispute-settlement, or 
even the judgments themselves, are the origin of a system that then, step by 
step, settles on customs. 
Even since the XIX century, Henry Sumner Maine, departing from Savigny’s 
interpretation (that dissolved law into ‘Volksgeist’) and from Austin (that re-
duced it to the imperative command of the Sovereign), as well as attempting 
to reconcile ‘conjectural history’, ‘generalizing method’, ‘biological organi-
cism’ and ‘diffusionism’ within a not always consistent whole, thought that 
‘legal judgments’ were the logical and historical prius of primitive law. Maine 
erroneously referred to the qšmistej which, when mentioned in Homer (at 
least in terms of pure ideology), never seem to be human sources of law, or 
human judgments on particular cases12. As witnessed in two passages from 
12 «When a king decided a dispute by a sentence, the judgment was assumed to be the re-
sult of direct inspiration. The divine agent, suggesting judicial awards to kings or to gods, the 
greatest of kings, was Themis. The peculiarity of the conception is brought out by the use of 
the plural. Themistes, the plural of Themis, are the awards themselves, divinely dictated to the 
judge. Kings are spoken of as if they had a store of Themistes ready to hand for use; but it must 
be distinctly understood that they are not laws, but judgments. Even in the Homeric poems, we 
can see that these ideas are transient. ‘Zeus, or the human king on earth’, says Mr. Grote, in his 
History of Greece, ‘is not a lawmaker, but a judge’. He is provided with Themistes, but, consist-
ently with the belief in their emanation from above, they cannot be supposed to be connected 
by any thread of principle; they are separate, isolated judgments. Parities of circumstance were 
probably commoner in the simple mechanism of ancient society than they are now, and in the 
succession of similar cases awards are likely to follow and resemble each other. Here we have 
the germ or rudiment of a Custom, a conception posterior to that of Themistes or judgments. 
However strongly we, with our modern associations, may be inclined to lay down a priori that 
the notion of a Custom must precede that of a judicial sentence, and that a judgment must af-
ﬁrm a Custom or punish its breach, it seems quite certain that the historical order of the ideas is 
that in which I have placed them. The Homeric word for a custom in the embryo is sometimes 
‘Themis’ in the singular-more often ‘Dike’, the meaning of which visibly ﬂuctuates between a 
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Homer13, they are ‘theo-genetic’ manifestations (that is to say provisions of di-
vine origins) of a substantive order that, providing the kings with the rules and 
with the principles applicable to single cases, obviously predates the judicial 
activity aimed at resolving human disputes (in a context in which, even if the 
litigation background is apparent, it seems difﬁcult to differentiate clearly, à la 
Montesquieu, between individual and autonomous powers). As for Homeric 
ideology, the qšmistej, in short, are not described in terms of judgments14 
given case by case on the ground of ‘compelling irrational methods of prov-
ing’; rather, they are principles and rules (prius) revealed upstream by the 
gods, kept for custody by the kings (perhaps, inside the palace, in a prototype 
of archive as suggested by the verb ™rÚw or œrumai), and inspiring as well as 
rooting the human judgments (posterius)15.
The ‘Wurzelbedeutung’-doctrine (what I would call those interpretations 
developed between the XIX and XX centuries in Germany) considers ‘tri-
al’ (concluded with a formal and ﬁnal declaratory judgment whose contents 
are completely compelled by irrational types evidence) one of the most an-
cient relics of the general objective order in force: in his famous study on 
‘judgment’ and a ‘custom’ or ‘usage’. Nomos, a Law, so great and famous term in the political 
vocabulary of the later Greek society, does not occur in Homer» (MAINE, 1908, p. 4; see, moreo-
ver, WEISS, 1923, p. 21; BONNER, SMITH, 1930, p. 9 ff.; CALHOUN, 1944, p. 9 f.; JONES, 1956, p. 29 
ff.). Against this reconstruction (that implies both the oracular nature of the primitive rules and 
the shift from ‘judgments’ to ‘customs’) see, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 29 ff. 
13 Hom., Il. 2.204-206: oÙk ¢gaqÕn polukoiran…h: eŒj ko…ranoj œstw, / eŒj basileÚj, 
ú dîke KrÒnou p£j ¢gkulom»tew / skÁptrÒn t’ ºd qšmistaj, †n£ sfisi bouleÚVsi; 
9.96-99: 'Atredh kÚdiste ¥nax ¢ndrîn 'Ag£memnon / ™n soˆ mn l»xw, sšo d’ ¥rxomai, 
oÛneka pollîn / laîn ™ssi ¥nax ka… toi ZeÝj ™ggu£lixe / skÁptrÒn t’ ºd qšmistaj, 
†n£ sfisi bouleÚVsqa (on these verses, see PELLOSO, 2012, p. 78 ff., 83 ff., 159). See, moreo-
ver, Schol. Hom., Il. 2.205 a 1: ú œdwke KrÒnou pa‹j: e„ m¾ g¦r Ãn, fhs…, kalÒn, oÙd’ ¨n 
oƒ qeoˆ aÙtù ™crînto. dhlo‹ d Óti mishtÕn aÙto‹j tÕ perˆ basile…aj filoneike‹n kaˆ 
diafšresqai, ¤ma d kaˆ shma…nei, Óti tÕ basileÚein oÙk œstin ¥llo À qeÒsdoton; 2.205 
a 2: ú œdwke KrÒnou pa‹j: e„ m¾ g¦r Ãn kalÒn, oÙd qeoˆ aÙtù ™crînto. ¤ma d shma…nei 
Óti qeÒsdotÒn ™sti tÕ tÁj basile…aj gšraj; 9.99 a: skÁptrÒn t’ºd qšmistaj: skÁptron 
di¦ tÕ kr£toj, qšmistaj di¦ tÕ d…kaion: oÜpw g¦r econ graptoÝj nÒmouj, ¢ll¦ tÕ p©n 
Ãn ™n to‹j kratoàsin; 9.99 b: skÁptrÒn t’ºd qšmistaj, †na sf…si bouleÚVsqa: †na toÚ-
toij crèmenoj probouleÚVj tîn Øpotetagmšnwn. æj toà basilšwj d kaˆ tîn qem…stwn 
kratoàntoj: oÙdšpw g¦r ™crînto grapto‹j nÒmoij.
14 In this erroneous sense, see, paradigmatically, GAGARIN, 1986, p. 106 nt. 16 and 19; and 
GAGARIN, 2008, p. 91, p. 20 nt. 14 (where qšmistej are described in terms of «traditional rules 
and customs of a community»).
15 Hom., Il. 1.233-239: ¢ll’ œk toi ™ršw kaˆ ™pˆ mšgan Órkon Ñmoàmai: / naˆ m¦ tÒde 
skÁptron, tÕ mn oÜ pote fÚlla kaˆ Ôzouj / fÚsei, ™peˆ d¾ prîta tom¾n ™n Ôressi 
lšloipen, / oÙd’ ¢naqhl»sei: perˆ g£r ·£ ˜ calkÕj œleye / fÚll£ te kaˆ floiÒn: nàn 
aâtš min uŒej 'Acaiîn / ™n pal£mVj foršousi dikaspÒloi, o† te qšmistaj / prÕj DiÕj 
e„rÚatai: Ö dš toi mšgaj œssetai Órkoj. 
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the main concepts of the primeval Greek legal dictionary (Themis, dike, und 
Verwandtes), Hirzel, while considering qšmij a particular oracular form of 
management of justice that is expressed through ‘Rathe’ (advices, counsels) 
whose substance is divinely inspired by the ‘Orakelgöttin’ (personiﬁcation of 
the primitive abstract concept «des guten Rathes»)16, connected the etymology 
of d…kh to the verb dike‹n and thus to the symbolic regal act of «schlagen» 
or «ausstrecken» (rather than «werfen») the sceptre while pronouncing the 
«Richterspruch»17. On the other hand, Ehrenberg – convinced by Usener’s 
thesis that denies «die primitive Ursprünglichkeit der Abstrakta» and main-
tains that «die Vergöttlichung ist die erste Form der Abstraktion» – within 
the context of the most ancient irrational justice seen as an ordeal («Los und 
Kampf») according to which «in den Einschränkungen der Selbsthilfe … die 
Gottheit wird Schiedsrichter», opines that, if qšmij primarily means ‘oracular 
binding decree’ (‘Gebot’)18, d…kh is the act of throwing a discus by the king 
or priest who «als Werfer im Gottesurteil wird er auch zum Richter», and 
who, according to the will of the gods, may or may not reach his target, so 
that the d…kh-throw takes on, by metonymy, the meaning of «Entscheidung 
vor dem Vertreter der Gottheit, dem Zauberer, Priester, König»19. According 
to this interpretation (in which d…kh is taken as a neuter term, or rather as a 
vox media), the references in Homer and Hesiod where d…kh is qualiﬁed as 
skoli£ or „qe‹a20 should be read as a metaphoric description of the ‘throw’, 
16 HIRZEL, 1907, p. 2 ff., 19 ff.; contra see GROTE, 1849, p. 111 f. and nt. 1.
17 «Nach den drei Bedeutungen von dike‹n, die hier in Frage kommen, kann daher d…kh 
entweder den Wurf oder den Schlag im engeren Sinn oder auch ein bloßes Ausstrecken des 
Stabes bedeuten. Immer es eine in das Auge fallende Handlung, in der sich die richterliche 
Entscheidung darstellte und die durch ihre sich einprägende Eigentuthumlichkeit es verhindert 
haben mag, dass nicht ebenso, wie kr…sij judicium und unser Urtheil, auch die d…kh auf andere 
als richterliche Erkenntnisse und Aussprüche übertragen wurde» (HIRZEL, 1907, p. 94 f.; cf. 57 
ff., 60 ff., 104 ff.).
18 See EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 1 ff., 42 f., 48 f.
19 EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 70 ff. (substantially according to Hirzel). The scholar, against «die 
übliche Ansicht» which interprets d…kh as «Weisung des Richters an die Parteien», assumes 
that, since dike‹n means «ausschließlich werfen» (EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 70 f. nt. 4), d…kh is a 
«Wurf durch den der Streit beendet wird», that «kann gerade und krumm sein», and that «kann 
auf einen bestimmten Punkt zugehen»: in Ehrenberg’s opinion, indeed, «gegen diese Etymo-
logie spricht die Tatsache, daß de…knumi niemals in Beziehung zur richterlichen Tatsache ver-
wendet wird, spricht vor allem, da unsere ältesten Belege mit der ‘Weisung’ nicht in Einklang 
zu bringen sind; weder liegt in ihr das den Streit Beendende noch Zuteilende; auch scheint 
‘Weisung’ ähnlich dem Spruch der qšmij, durchaus nur dem Willen und der Überlegung des 
Richters zu entspringen, während die Iliasstellen darauf hindeuteten, daß das Geben der d…kh 
nicht vom Ermessen des Richtenden abhängt» (see, moreover, in a very similar fashion, WOLF, 
1950, p. 85 ff.).
20 See, on the one hand, Hesiod., Op. 219, 221, 250, 262, and, on the other hand, Hom., Il. 
18.508, 23.580; Hymn. 2.149-152; Hesiod., Theog. 81-87; Op. 36, 225 f.
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targeted or not, of the d…kh-judgment by the judge, similarly to the throw of 
a ‘stick-sceptre’, a ‘discus’ or an ‘arrow’, given that the adjective „qÚj and 
the verb „qÚnw suggest the movement of a dart in a straight line: however, 
this single-minded view urges us to translate d…kh with ‘judgment’21 and is 
based on a rushed etymological reconstruction, unanimously rejected by the 
best linguists (even if, as regards such an issue, a very communis opinio has 
not been reached yet)22.
Some scholars, indeed, maintain that the noun d…kh and the verb de…knumi 
share the same root23: for example, developing an hypothesis already put for-
ward by Gustave Glotz, Emile Benveniste conjectured that the original mean-
ing of d…kh is ‘human objective order’, that is to say ‘authoritative verbal indi-
cation of what must be’, while the secondary sense is ‘legal formula preserved 
and implemented by a judge’24. Thus, if qšmij is considered a system of rules 
that are de facto a ‘common law’, emerged within the most ancient family 
groups, for which either the ‘divine origins’ are underlined or the ‘targets of 
the rules’, aimed at regulating the clans, are underscored, d…kh is a ‘potentially 
political’ human order25. From the primary semantic connotation of ‘direction’ 
and ‘indication’ (mainly in the form of a judgment), the sign, through the con-
notation in terms of ‘judicial formula’ that establishes the fate, shifted to a 
concept of ‘custom’, ‘usage’, ‘way of life’, as well as to that of ‘justice’. This 
21 See, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 103 ff.
22 See GONDA, 1929, p. 224 ff.; LOENEN, 1948, p. 222 ff.; PALMER, 1950, p. 157 ff., 160; FRISK, 
1960, sv. d…kh; CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. d…kh; BENVENISTE, 1974, p. 107 ff. Cf., moreover, PAZDERNIK, 
1976, p. 72, who – also in the light of Hom., Il. 18.508 and 23.574 – reminds, as regards the root 
*dik, «noch die weitere Bedeutung wägen», and for the noun d…kh the following semantic con-
notations: ‘Sitte’, ‘Naturgesetz’, iustum, ius, iustitia, ‘Rechtsentscheidung’».
23 See, among the others, GONDA, 1929, p. 224 ff.; LOENEN, 1948, p. 222 ff.; LATTE, 1968; 
LLOYD-JONES, 1971, p. 166 nt. 23; BEHREND, 1979; SCHMIDT, 1991, c. 30; JANIK, 2000, p. 9 nt. 
19; GSCHNITZER, 1997, p. 6 f.; 2; PENTA, 2000, p. 677; Ostwald’s reconstruction is peculiarly sui 
generis: «dike, whose etymology links it to a stem meaning ‘show’, ‘point in a given direction’, 
usually describes the place assigned to individuals within human society: it seems originally to 
designate claims or rights which deﬁne the place a person occupies within a community, often 
with the connotation that this place is actually or potentially assigned by the verdict of a judge» 
(OSTWALD, 1973, p. 674). In Chantraine’s opinion, to be honest, the lemma d…kh, even if con-
nected to de…knumi, at the beginning would stand for «direction»; then it would have shifted to 
«règle, usage», «justice», and ﬁnally to «jugement développé dans un vocabulaire technique» 
(CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. d…kh).
24 GLOTZ, 1904, p. 239; 1924, p. 118; BENVENISTE, 1974, p. 107 ff.; contra, see FRISCH, 1976, 
p. 38 ff., 45 f.; RUDHARDT, 1999, p. 104 ff.; PELLOSO, 2012, p. 139 ff.
25 See GLOTZ, 1924, p. 118; JONES, 1956, p. 32; IMBERT, 1962, p. 17 and nt. 6; DELORME, 1964, 
p. 36 f.; DE ROMILLY, 1971 = 2005, p. 17; BENVENISTE, 1974, p. 107 ff.; LO SCHIAVO, 1994, p. 13, 
31 ff., 35; GRIFFIN, 1995, p. 91; FASSÒ, 2001, p. 12; see, moreover, GIOFFREDI, 1962, p. 69 ff.; 
LLOYD-JONES, 1971, p. 166 nt. 23; KÖSTLER, 1979, p. 13. 
(8) www.rivistadirittoellenico.it 
RDE 3-2013 14 dic 14.indd   230 14/12/2014   16.42.37
R ED
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO ELLENICO
ARTICOLI
III/2013
 The Myth of the Priority of Procedure over Substance 231
reconstruction, in my opinion, may be considered too abstract and fanciful. 
From a general perspective, it is not grounded on a cogent historical analysis; 
from a particular perspective, nature, borders, and aims of the sphere of d…kh 
seem to be found out only a contrariis, that is by beginning from the prede-
termined area of qšmij. First of all, it is not true that archaic sources limit the 
latter system exclusively to endo-family relationships (just think of the impor-
tance of qšmij in public assemblies and counsels)26 and, while it may be true 
that epos stresses (also, but not only) the ‘divine nature’ of such a system, it 
is not equally true that the former is characterised as being a ‘human judicial 
order’ that turns into customary law regulating inter-familial relationships: as 
we will see later, the concept of d…kh, for the most part of its heterogeneous 
and multi-faceted uses, does not seem to be concerned with an ‘(objective) 
law’ whose source might be considered either the judgment, or the custom, 
but it rather copes with ‘(subjective) personal positions recognized by a prior 
positive order’.
As for Gagarin, his reconstruction must be considered together with his 
wider general theory of ancient Greek law. Indeed, he starts from the well-
known dichotomy (more conceptual than chronological) of pre-law and law, 
postulated by Gernet, and develops, from an analytical perspective, quite a 
complex reconstruction. Gernet, as it is well known, is not only convinced 
that «un minimum d’Etat» is necessary for any legal system; he also maintains 
that only the existence of a ‘judicial system’, albeit a rudimentary one, proves 
that the boundary of pre-law has been passed: indeed, also and above all for 
the Greek world, he says, law exists only if the jurisdictional process exists, 
going so far as to maintain that the most ancient form of law was not the ‘leg-
islative command’, but, rather, the ‘judgment’27. Gagarin, instead, drawing on 
Hart’s positive theory28, believes that Law is only the set of rules recognised 
as such, usually by being written down, and assumes for the Greek world the 
development of the pre-legal phase into the fully legal one through the proto-
26 See Hom., Il. 9.29-33: •Wj œfaq’, o‰ d’ ¥ra p£ntej ¢k¾n ™gšnonto siwpÍ. / d¾n d’ 
¥neJ Ãsan tetihÒtej uŒej 'Acaiîn: / Ñy d d¾ metšeipe bo¾n ¢gaqÕj Diom»dhj: / 'Atredh 
soˆ prîta mac»somai ¢fradšonti, / ¿ qšmij ™stˆn ¥nax ¢gorÍ: sÝ d m» ti colwqÍj;  
24.649-652: tÕn d’ ™pikertomšwn prosšfh pÒdaj çkÝj 'AcilleÚj: / ™ktÕj mn d¾ lšxo gšron 
f…le, m» tij 'Acaiîn / ™nq£d’ ™pšlqVsin boulhfÒroj, o† tš moi a„eˆ / boul¦j bouleÚousi 
par»menoi, ¿ qšmij ™st…. See, moreover, Hom., Il. 15.95, 20.4 ff.; Od. 2.69.
27 GERNET, 1968, p. 175 ff.: the ‘prédroit’ is «un état où les relations que nous nommons 
juridiques seraient conçues suivant un autre mode de pensée que le droit proprement dit», while 
the ‘droit’ is «une technique autonome» implying «un minimum d’État», so that it is natural to 
suppose that the ﬁrst ‘juridical’ meaninig of d…kh is ‘jugement’ (GERNET, 1955, p. 2, 18, 69 f.).
28 HART, 1961, 89 ff., basically distinguishes between ‘primary rules’ (which impose obliga-
tions) and ‘secondary rules’ (which are concerned with the creation proceedings and with the 
operation of the primary rules, above all in legal procedure).
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legal phase29. The ﬁrst phase (pre-Homeric) is supposedly characterised by 
the absence of primary rules and secondary rules, while the second one (Ho-
meric) by the existence of public and formal procedures and by the absence 
of a coherent, non-contradictory system of substantive rules (as supposedly 
demonstrated by the contradiction between the rule invoked by Agamemnon 
to support his taking of Briseis and the one invoked by Achilles to support the 
irrevocable nature of the joint resolution for the division of the booty and, so, 
the loss caused to himself by Agamemnon)30. 
This rough – even if fascinating – development does not seem to me to be 
fully convincing: just think of the fact that the dispute between Achilles and 
Agamemnon over Briseis is not a symptom of a conﬂict between (primary) 
rules with the same level of importance and belonging to the same substan-
tive inconsistent system; in this case, there is only a violation of the rules 
for the division of the booty on the part of the Mycenaean king which, at the 
same time, injuries the personal position of Achilles31; moreover, the poems 
attest rules, albeit loose ones, for the calling and holding of assemblies, as 
well as for their ‘provinces’ and ‘powers’32, and rules that envisage – with no 
29 All in all, GAGARIN, 1986, p. 8 f., suggests a three-stage model for the development of law 
in society: «the ﬁrst, which I shall call the ‘pre-legal’ stage … is where the society has no recog-
nized (i.e., formal and public) procedures for peacefully settling disputes among its members. 
I assume that every human society has some means of settling disputes or it could not remain 
together as a society, but it is possible that in a small group these may be only informal. Many 
preliterate societies, however, have recognizable procedures for settling disputes that meet the 
criteria I have set forth, and I shall designate this second stage of development, in which a so-
ciety has legal procedures but no recognized legal rules (in Hart’s sense), as ‘proto-legal’. The 
third, fully ‘legal’ stage of development is where a society has recognized legal rules, as well as 
procedures, a step that almost always requires the knowledge of writing. I would certainly not 
insist on the universal validity of this or any other model. I claim only that it is a possible model 
for development, and I believe it will provide a useful framework for examining the emergence 
of law in early Greece» (see, also, GAGARIN, 1986, p. 2 f., 136, 144; GAGARIN, 1973, p. 81 ff.). 
From a purely logical perspective, Gagarin’s reasoning is not a persuasive one, given the patent 
inconsistency between his main premises and the conclusions that he reaches: if, in the Homeric 
poetry, voluntary ‘arbitration’ is supposed to be the only method of dispute settlement and if 
‘primary rules’ do not coexist in a coherent and harmonious system, which is the rationality 
of the following outcomes: «despite the various ambiguities in the settlement of disputes in 
Homer, however, two very general principles seem to be universally upheld, however loose and 
unpredictable their application in a speciﬁc case: the adherence to, or restoration of, norms of 
proper behavior, and compensation for damages, whether by restitution, or retribution, or both» 
(GAGARIN, 1986, p. 100)?
30 See, on these issues, the persuasive remarks pointed out by CANTARELLA, 1987, p. 158 ff.
31 See Hom., Il. 19.180 and 9.605, on which, see WILSON, 2002, p. 102.
32 A) Hom., Il. 2.48 ff., 9.9 ff.; Od. 2.6 ff., 8.7 ff.; B) Il. 18.246 ff., 19.50; Od. 2.1 ff., 3.173 
ff., 8.1 ff., 9.170 ff., 10.178 ff.; C) Il. 9.33; D) Il. 1.118 ff., 1.135 ff., 1.161 ff., 9.330 ff., 11.704 
f., 12.310 ff., 16.53 ff., 18.444; Od. 7.150; Il. 7.489 ff., 1.11 ff., 3.94 ff., 3.209 ff., 7.345 ff.,  
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inconsistency – negative consequences for any violation of the ‘heroic code’ 
(either ipso iure in terms of authorized revenge, or iure contractus in terms 
of ‘Wergeld’, that is compensatory and punitive damages whose amount is 
agreed through a process of compromise reached by the injured party and the 
offender)33. Indeed, even overlooking its evolutionist model (whose aporias 
are often ﬁlled with anthropological comparisons) and its unfounded opti-
mism that ﬁnds eternal regularities and continuity in history, this thesis is to be 
rejected, in my opinion, for several other reasons. As shall be demonstrated, 
it is indeed contradicted by Homer: the evidence from the age of heroes on 
d…kai, as well as on qšmistej, does not speak in favour of the historical and 
logical priority of ‘procedural law’ over ‘substantive law34. Gagarin inappro-
priately ﬂattens out the cultural, topographical, and chronological pluralism 
described in the poems, creating a ‘meta-historical’ unicum, peremptorily de-
ﬁned in terms of ‘proto-law’35. Secondary rules are simplistically reduced to 
the ‘procedural’ ones (while, for instance, one should even consider, at this 
level, ‘attribution’ and ‘deﬁnition’ rules); traditional, non-written law seems to 
be not even taken into account and, at the same time, the role played by writ-
ing is overrated (since he mistakenly jumbles up the varying forms of law and 
its characteristic contents). In practice, the phenomenon of law is, in a very 
naïf way, exclusively conﬁned to the ‘imperative order’36, at the same time 
postulating (without any inside diachronic analysis) that in Homeric times, in 
the absence of consistent primary rules, the only process described is arbitra-
tion37. Thus, neither Gernet’s well-known dichotomic version of the roots of 
7.381 ff., 19.173, 19.229, 18.497 ff.; Od. 2.291, 4.630 ff., 8.36, 8.109 f., 8.258 f.; Il. 1.54 ff., 
11.165; Od. 2.30 ff., 3.82, 4.314; Il. 7.345 ff., 9.1 ff., 1.118 ff., 1.184 ff.
33 See, paradigmatically, Hom., Il. 5.265 ff.; 11.696 ff.; 13.410 ff.; 13.445 ff.; 13.656 ff.; 
14.496 ff.; 14.478 ff.; 15.113 ff., 16.394 ff.; 17.34 ff.; 18.497 ff.; 21.26 ff.
34 See PELLOSO, 2012, p. 76 ff., 102 ff.
35 See CANTARELLA, 2001, p. 4 ff.
36 See, against this conception, PATTARO, 2005, p. 9 ff.
37 GAGARIN, 1986, p. 100: «the early Greeks probably did not distinguish sharply between 
a just procedure and a just ﬁnal settlement. The word dike can designate either the procedure, 
or the settlement, or both. In the system for settling disputes that prevailed in early Greece, in 
which disputes were voluntarily submitted for settlement, a just settlement (that is, a settlement 
acceptable to both sides) would be the normal result of a just procedure». Actually, the topic is 
still sub iudice: see, on the one hand, WOLFF, 1946, p. 131 ff.; GERNET, 1955, p. 61 ff.; BISCARDI, 
1982, p. 357 and nt. 34-37; CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 147 ff.; (for the theory postulating that legal 
procedure derives from self-help); contra, on the other hand, see STEINWENTER, 1925, p. 29 ff.; 
CALHOUN, 1944, p. 7 ff. (for the ‘arbitration theory’). Anyway, nobody can deny that the process 
described in Achilles’ shield (Hom., Il. 18.497 ff.) – whether one interprets it as a full legal 
procedure, or as an example of arbitration – is far from sharing cultural background and age, 
methods of deciding, nature, structure with the judicial processes elsewhere depicted or just 
implied in the Homeric poems: see, for instance, Hom., Od. 11.568-571 (œnq’ Ã toi M…nwa 
‡don, DiÕj ¢glaÕn uƒÒn, / crÚseon skÁptron œconta qemisteÚonta nškussin, / ¼menon: oƒ 
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the Greek legal experience, nor Gagarin’s more articulated tripartite schema, 
that invents the ﬁgure of the ‘proto-legal’ world, are fully convincing. This 
also because, with regard to the general theory of law, the ﬂashiest datum of 
juridical phenomenology, that is procedure, is elevated to the ontological quid 
of the latter, and any non ‘authoritative’ form of law, in primis, the lively and 
warm ‘Volksgeist’38, i.e. the ‘legal conscience of the people’ (ideologically 
conceived in terms of tradition, rather than custom)39 is mercilessly uprooted. 
Not every law, indeed, commands or forbids a human behaviour. Indeed laws 
can also authorise (i.e. ‘they do not forbid’) the autonomous carrying out of 
a particular behaviour (for instance, the hero, holding the sceptre in his hand, 
can contradict the king himself during the council of warriors)40 or they can 
leave the subject free (i.e. ‘they do not oblige him or her’) to do or not to do 
something (for instance, an offended party can accept the poin» offered by 
the offender, or revenge)41. The primeval source of law must not be found in 
procedure alone, even in the absence of a law-maker: indeed, if Gernet and 
Gagarin were right, tradition (rather than custom, at least from an ideological 
point of view) would have had no part in the birth and development of the 
Greek legal experience and it would not be possible to explain institutions, 
already existing in Homer, that no one would hesitate to classify as legal, such 
as: the following rules: if not that one mandating the puriﬁcation of the priest 
before a funeral, that of the pre-nuptial donations of the mnhstšrej, that of 
mourning by the wife, that of the payment of ¥poina as a ransom for the lib-
eration of a captive, that of the exchange of gifts between xe‹noi, those ones 
concerned with the stages of the legal process; moreover, it would not be pos-
sible to explain the binding force already conferred to private agreements.
Given this historical and theoretical framework of reference, Gagarin’s the-
sis can be easily summarised: «dike and its derivatives have a broad set of ap-
plications and can refer either to the legal process and its proper functioning or 
dš min ¢mfˆ d…kaj e‡ronto ¥nakta, / ¼menoi ˜staÒtej te, kat’ eÙrupulj ”Adoj dî); Il. 
1.237-239 (nàn aâtš min uŒej 'Acaiîn / ™n pal£mVj foršousi dikaspÒloi, o† te qšmistaj 
/ prÕj DiÕj e„rÚatai); Od. 11.185-186 (Thlšmacoj temšnea nšmetai kaˆ da‹taj ™saj / 
da…nutai, §j ™pšoike dikaspÒlon ¥ndr’ ¢legÚnein); 12.439-441 (Ãmoj d’ ™pˆ dÒrpon ¢n¾r 
¢gorÁqen ¢nšsth / kr…nwn ne…kea poll¦ dikazomšnwn a„zhîn, / tÁmoj d¾ t£ ge doàra 
CarÚbdioj ™xefa£nqh). Thence, assuming in a general and undifferentiated way both that 
arbitration is the only type of proceeding for the settlement of disputes which emerges from the 
Homeric verses, and that compulsive legal procedure is totally unknown is, to say the least, a 
trivializing and superﬁcial reconstruction.
38 See VON SAVIGNY, 1840 a, p. 14 ff., 22, 35; 1840 b, p. 8 ff.
39 See, on the difference existing between ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’, the important remarks 
pointed out by TALAMANCA, 2008.
40 Hom., Il. 9.29-33.
41 See CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 147 ff.
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to social norms and proper behavior»42. In a more precise manner, this scholar 
(rightly) rejects the temptation to extrapolate a priori an original semantic uni-
ty from some sound positions by Palmer43 and (erroneously) chooses to give 
precedence to the procedural dimension of d…kh, even at the cost of forcing the 
literal data of the sources. Indeed, Gagarin identiﬁes two different meanings 
for the root *deik: on the one hand, «sign, mark, characteristic», from which 
the meaning of «characteristic, traditional, proper behaviour» derived, even 
though it is «conﬁned to the Odyssey»44; on the other hand, «boundary, divid-
ing line, in particular the dividing boundary between two property claims, the 
line being either ‘straight’ or ‘crooked’»45, which is connected to the second-
ary sense of «settlement or decision between two contestants, that is placing a 
‘boundary line’ (straight or crooked) between them»46, or of «ruling or settle-
ment which might be made (or merely proposed) between two parties in any 
dispute»47. This primitive structure is the basis from which a complex and fur-
ther semantic sphere (‘rules’ and ‘behaviours’ concerning ‘traditional rights’) 
started evolving until, as Hesiod attests, the sense of «litigation process, legal 
system, law, rule of law» became common48. To sum up, Gagarin believes that 
d…kh can be reduced to two «separate areas of meaning, characteristic and set-
tlement» and, at the same time, that it is «an insigniﬁcant word in Homer»49. 
Similarly, Havelock – by proceeding often through generic and allusive state-
ments – reduces d…kh and d…kai to procedures adopted, with a certain ﬂex-
ibility, in speciﬁc occasions that required a ‘direction’, as well as the ability 
to quote the appropriate precepts from memory: in Havelock’s view, justice 
42 GAGARIN, 1986, p. 100 nt. 5.
43 As regards Palmer’s opinion, once remarked that d…kh «is a derivative from the root 
*deik», as well as «there is little doubt about the basic meaning of this root *deik, which is 
exempliﬁed in the verb ‘I show, point out’», this scholar underlines that «Greek shows no trace 
of the development ‘to say’, and so d…kh cannot mean ‘pronouncement’ of the judge» since 
«Greek is faithful to the primary signiﬁcance of the root ‘mark, indicate’», and that «the idioms 
used in many passages in early Greek literature from Homer onwards» seem to suggest mainly 
the meaning «boundary or limit», i.e. a sign doomed to shift «to the sense ‘allotted portion, 
rightful portion, lot, fate’» (PALMER, 1950, p. 157 ff., 160; BISCARDI, 1982, p. 354; PELLOSO, 
2012, p. 108 ff., 144).
44 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 82 f. (Hom., Od. 4.691, 11.218, 14.59, 18.275, 19.43, 19.168, 24.255). 
See, also, OSTWALD, 1973, p. 677, who underlines the meaning «essential characteristic of a 
group on the basis of which a certain kind of conduct can be expected from the individual 
members belonging to that group».
45 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 83.
46 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 82.
47 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 83, 84 ff. (Hom., Il. 16.542, 16.386-388, 18.508, 19.180, 23.542; Od. 
3.244, 9.215, 11.570, 14.83 f.).
48 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 87 (Hesiod., Op. 9, 192, 213, 217, 220, 249, 256, 269, 275, 278, 279, 283).
49 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 87.
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in early Greece was just «a procedure»50, so that no Greek at that time would 
have thought to ask such a fundamental question: «what is justice?»51. In par-
ticular, besides making the qšmistej signify ‘legal precepts’, ‘oral maxims’, he 
concludes that justice in the Iliad is not a principle or a set of principles: d…kh 
is ‘justice’ (that is the ‘formal iter’, the ‘procedural model’ that the parties have 
to follow through rhetoric negotiation) applied to a speciﬁc case (whether in a 
friendly transaction or in a dispute), while the d…kai turn out to be public proce-
dures, verbal decisions or transactions; in the Odyssey, the noun d…kh is used for 
general procedures and behaviours that are commonly accepted and required; 
d…kh would be, in short, the ‘code’ followed by the people52.
3. Some preliminary general criticisms.
 
The above mentioned interpretation seems to me less than satisfying for 
several reasons. As already noted, the poems’ internal diachrony is completely 
50 HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 137: «in sum, the ‘justice’ of the Iliad is a procedure, not a principle 
or any set of principles. It is arrived at by a process of negotiation between contending par-
ties carried out rhetorically. As such, it is particular, not general, in its references, and can be 
thought of either in the singular or in the plural – the ‘right of it’ in a given case or ‘the rights’ 
as argued and settled in one or more cases. There is no judiciary conceived as an independent 
state authority, but there are experts on oral ‘law’ – men with specially equipped memories, 
one would guess. Judicial functions are mainly conﬁned to presiding, listening, speaking, and 
sensing a consensus in the audience; they are shared or passed around indifferently between the 
experts, acting as ‘managers of justices’, the elders or the contestants themselves, according to 
circumstance. The procedure takes place in public, because in a preliterate society the memory 
of the public is the only available attestation as to what is promised or agreed to. However loose 
or vague the procedure may appear from the standpoint of literate practice, it worked effectively 
to preserve ‘law and order’ (eunomia) in the city-states of early Hellenism. It supplied those 
directive formulas which were also corrective, a necessary supplement to the nomos and ethos 
as normatively taught and accepted. Such procedures may have been of immemorial origin, 
invented to control the impact of individuation upon nascent human communities».
51 HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 248: «it would not have occurred to a Greek of the archaic age to ask 
himself ‘What is justice?’ or to get into an argument with his neighbor about its ‘nature’. Would 
he even be able to think about justice as anything except something that occurs or is stated inci-
dentally in a procedure in which men gather to judge and arbitrate their differences? And if he 
could neither state it nor come to terms with it otherwise, how can we say that justice ‘existed’ 
for him, as concept or as principle?».
52 ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 177, sums up the communis opinio as follows: «lexicographically 
the uses of d…kh form two groups that appear at ﬁrst to be unrelated. The ﬁrst group consists 
of particular juridical uses. The second consists of more abstract uses which touch upon the 
norms of human institutions and customs. Most of the several juridical senses fall into one of 
the following categories: 1) the verdict by which certain kinds of claims are validated; 2) the 
process or forum of adjudication, i.e. the ‘trial’ or ‘court’ in modern parlance; 3) a claim regarded by 
the claimant as valid, but which has not been validated by adjudication; 4) a claim which, although 
adjudicated in some manner, is still open to legitimate dispute; and 5) punishment or retribution».
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ignored53, so that the scholarly operation that takes for granted the existence of 
an aoristic model of ‘dispute settlement’ is, at any rate, a mono-dimensional 
one that cannot give a sufﬁcient account of the legal institutions sketched in 
the poems (for instance, the administration of justice by a ‘panel of judges’, 
such as the court painted on Achilles’ shield, looks as if it is much more recent 
than the Mycenaean ¥nax presented several times as a ‘single-judge court’); 
the presence of cases in which d…kh becomes patently a principle and Zeus 
is not an unpredictable god, but a true tutelary deity of justice is calculatedly 
overlooked54; with the exclusion of those few occurrences where it would be 
difﬁcult to deny the alleged procedural meaning of d…kh55, and where this 
noun suggests a full-ﬂedged principle56, it is my ﬁrm belief that d…kh is main-
ly found as ‘subjective situation’ (advantageous or disadvantageous), even 
though there is undoubtedly a wide range of semantic shades. Thus, if that 
is true, qšmij and d…kh should not be conceived as two homogeneous legal 
concepts hinting at two systems – both historically grounded on ‘judgments’ 
and ‘customs’ – whose disciplines and regimens differ in terms of ‘sources of 
the rules’ (gods vs human beings) or ‘addressees of the rules’ (members of the 
family vs members of the society)57; rather, they are heterogeneous concepts, 
the former indicating the system in which human relationships must be placed, 
the latter showing the multiple situations capable of being ascribed to the in-
dividuals within such a system, and of being essentially described in terms of 
‘rights’, ‘entitlements’, ‘interests’, ‘faculties’, ‘powers’, ‘claims’, ‘remedies’, 
and in terms of ‘duties’, ‘obligations’, ‘liabilities’. All in all, the antithesis 
between qšmij and d…kh, in my opinion, resembles the opposition existing 
53 See, synthetically, ERCOLANI, 2006, p. 56: «l’esame di alcuni fatti della cultura materia-
le e di alcuni codici etici permette di cogliere disomogeneità del quadro culturale descritto 
nei poemi omerici, che, come insieme, non coincide con nessuna delle epoche storiche a 
noi note», sicché «al di là della distorsione della realtà propria dell’elaborazione poetica, 
questa disomogeneità è sensatamente spiegabile solo come risultato di una stratiﬁcazione 
progressiva della tradizione poetica, che ha desunto elementi da ogni fase storica attraverso 
cui è transitata, afﬁancandoli – in maniera a volte contraddittoria – a quelli già presenti al suo 
interno». As Cantarella maintains, the diachronic analysis «consente di datare storicamente 
le informazioni omeriche», since «appiattite su un unico orizzonte temporale, queste si con-
traddicono al punto da costringere a negar loro valore storico» (CANTARELLA, 2001, p. 11; cf. 
EAD., 1994, p. 38 ff., 176 ff.).
54 See LLOYD-JONES, 1971, p. 166 nt. 23, who quotes, at least, Hom., Il. 16.388 and Od. 14.84 
(even if this scholar believes that the primeval meaning of the noun d…kh is «judgment given 
by a judge»). As far as the process of ‘abstraction’ (which would have characterized the evolu-
tion of the semantic sphere of d…kh) is concerned, see, ex plurimis, OSTWALD, 1973, p. 675 ff.; 
ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 2003, 175 ff.; JANIK, 2003, p. 13 ff., 89 ff.; LEWIS, 2006, p. 42 ff.
55 See Hom., Od. 19.106-111.
56 Beyond Hom., Il. 16.388 and Od. 14.84, one may consider Il. 16.541-543: see, infra, p. 255.
57 See, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 129 ff.
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between the ‘rules in force in a given system’ and the ‘(legal) situations recog-
nized and/or protected by a given system’. Contrary to the view that conﬁnes 
the concept of d…kh to the legal process, as judgment or procedure, and only 
subordinately to customary order or individual character, I maintain that d…kh 
is neither a source of law (judgment; custom; statute; tradition), nor a rule, nor 
a procedure; indeed Homer’s epos conveys the different meaning of ‘subjec-
tive situation in or out of court’58.
4. The killer, the dead and the divine thief: d…kh and legal procedure.
In the light of the previous general remarks, it is necessary to consider the 
Iliad ﬁrst. With regard to a context of ‘civil litigation’, mention must be made 
of the very famous judicial scene depicted on Achilles’ shield (even though 
with the awareness of the inadequacy of the following observations compared 
to the importance of the topic)59: as everybody knows, in the ¢gor» a dispute 
arose between a murderer and the relatives of the victim, with regard to the 
poin» (‘Wergeld’, ‘blood-money’) to be submitted to a court of gšrontej, in 
front of the lao… and with the participation of a ‡stwr.
In primis, it is my ﬁrm belief that the ancient interpretation which refers the 
verses at issue essentially to the quaestio facti (i.e. whether the payment of the 
poin» has been made) sounds quite convincing60. The following arguments 
may prove my point.
1) The symmetric use of two verba dicendi followed by two aorist inﬁni-
tives (p£nt’ ¢podoànai: ‘I have paid all’; mhdn ˜lšsqai: ‘I have received 
nothing’) is deﬁnitely eloquent. EÜcomai (‘I claim’, ‘I assume in the com-
plaint/petition’, given the procedural context, more than ‘I declare’, ‘I state to 
58 Hom., Il. 1.237-239, 1.540-543, 8.430-431, 11.830-832, 13.3-6, 16.386-388, 16.541-543, 
18.497-508, 19.178-180, 19.180-183, 23.539-542, 23.573-580; Od. 2.281 f., 3.52, 3.130-134,. 
3.244, 4.686-693, 6.117-121, 8.575, 9.175-177, 9.213-215, 11.185 f., 11.215-222, 11.541-547, 
11.570, 12.439-441, 13.201, 13.209, 14.57-61, 14.80-84, 14.89-92, 18.274-280, 18.414 f., 
19.35-43, 19.106-111, 19.164-170, 20.294-295, 20.322 f., 21.312 f., 24.249-255.
59 Hom., Il. 18.496-508: laoˆ d’ e„n ¢gorÍ œsan ¢qrÒoi: œnqa d ne‹koj / çrèrei, dÚo 
d’ ¥ndrej ™ne…keon e†neka poinÁj / ¢ndrÕj ¢pofqimšnou: Ö mn eÜceto p£nt’ ¢podoànai / 
d»mJ pifaÚskwn, Ö d’ ¢na…neto mhdn ˜lšsqai: / ¥mfw d’ ƒšsqhn ™pˆ ‡stori pe‹rar 
˜lšsqai. / laoˆ d’ ¢mfotšroisin ™p»puon ¢mfˆj ¢rwgo…: / k»rukej d’ ¥ra laÕn ™r»tuon: 
o‰ d gšrontej / e†at’ ™pˆ xesto‹si l…qoij ƒerù ™nˆ kÚklJ, / skÁptra dkhrÚkwn ™n cšrs’ 
œcon ºerofènwn: / to‹sin œpeit’ ½sson, ¢moibhdˆj d d…kazon. / ke‹to d’ ¥r’ ™n mšssoisi 
dÚw cruso‹o t£lanta, / tù dÒmen Öj met¦ to‹si d…khn „qÚntata e‡poi. For a contextualiza-
tion of these verses, see SCHOLTEN, 2004; VÉLISSAROPULOS-KARAKOSTAS, 2003.
60 Ancient commentators, for the most part, believe that the question concerns the payment 
of the blood-money: see NOACK-HILGERS, 1999.
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have a right’, ‘I promise’, ‘I’m ready to swear’) indicates – in my opinion – the 
procedural position of a ‘formal claimant’, who, in this particular case, is also a 
‘substantive defendant’. Most likely, by bringing the legal action explicitly for 
a ‘judicial declaration’ and implicitly for an ‘injunctive relief’, the offender: a) 
makes a formal attack on the enforcement initiated by the counterparty (i.e. a 
member of the victim’s family) that asserts to be entitled to act in retaliation; 
b) refrains the counterparty from proceeding with the revenge till an ofﬁcial 
and binding judgment is given at the end of the procedure61. 'Ana…nomai (‘I 
object in the answer’, given the procedural context, more than ‘I deny’ or ‘I 
61 That the verse 499 describes the ‘facts’ alleged by the plaintiff (i.e. the murderer as the 
party that, taking the legal action, assumes to have performed its own duty) in the ﬁrst plead 
(i.e. a sort of ‘statement of claim’) nowadays is not largely disputed (see CALHOUN, 1923, p. 18; 
BONNER, SMITH, 1930, p. 32 ff.; WOLFF, 1946; HOMMEL, 1969 = 1988; PRIMMER, 1970, p. 11 ff.; 
CANTARELLA, 1979, p. 224 ff.; GAGARIN, 1986, p. 27 ff.; SEALEY, 1994, p. 103; THÜR, 1996, p. 66 
f.; CANTARELLA, 2002; FUSAI, 2006, p. 31 ff.). On the one hand, the interpretation that gives the 
verb eÜcomai the meaning ‘to claim the right to impose unilaterally on the victim’s relatives 
the acceptance of the blood-money’ (see CARAWAN, 1998, p. 55 and nt. 24; cf. MÜLLNER, 1976, p. 
104; EDWARDS, 1991; WESTBROOK, 1992, p. 73 f.; NAGY, 1997) is both historically and semanti-
cally ungrounded. First, as for the Homeric poems, no offender has such a substantive right and, 
consequently, no judge – through a declaratory judgment and an injunction – can allow claims 
alike and force the injured party to accept the proposed blood-money (see, paradigmatically, 
Hom., Il. 9.636 ff., 23.83 ff.): ergo, either one must assume – from a procedural and substan-
tive point of view – that this reconstruction is entirely implausible, or one must think – from a 
procedural point of view – that the murderer’s claim, as it would be implied in the judicial scene 
depicted in the shield, is just a ‘phony’ one and, therefore, that the judgment is doomed to be 
given for the defendant, i.e. the victim’s relative (this argument is overlooked by CANTARELLA, 
2002). Second, the verb eÜcomai does not present such a peculiar sense: indeed the only basis 
to make eÜcomai mean ‘to claim the right’ is a supposed analogy between verse 499 and PY 
Ep 704, 5-6 (e-ri-ta i-je-re-ja e-ke|e-u-ke-to-qe e-to-ni-jo e-ke-e|te-o da-mo-de-mi pa-si ko-
to-na|ke-ke-me-na-o o-na-to e-ke-e), where «the ‘priestess’ Eritha is recorded as ‘holding’ and 
‘claiming to hold’ ‘e-to-ni-jo’ land ‘for the deity’ (‘te-o’ interpreted as a dative)», while this claim 
«is … disputed by the ‘damos’», that opposes «that she has an ‘o-na-to’ plot of the land category 
known as ‘ko-to-na-o ke-ke-me-na-o’ (partitive gen. plur.)» (PALAIMA, 2000, p. 8; NAGY, 1997). 
Instead, it is true that this assumption reveals a patent legal mistake, since it is clear that in PY 
Ep 704 the noun ‘e-to-ni-jo’ shows that the claim is concerned with a ‘quaestio iuris’, while the 
verb ‘e-u-ke-to’ discloses the existence of a claim brought against the ‘da-mo’, without imply-
ing per se such an issue (see, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 127 f. nt. 72). On the other hand, the 
similar translation ‘to offer, to promise’ (see, for the quotation of the scholars following this 
opinion, FUSAI, 2006, p. 10 f. nt. 2, and only paradigmatically, among the most recent authors, 
MACDOWELL, 1978, p. 19 ff.) is just historically erroneous: indeed, notwithstanding this inter-
pretation is semantically acceptable (even if the future inﬁnitive would be more appropriate: 
see GAGARIN, 1981, p. 14), unless one thinks that the shield sketches a ‘frivolous’ or ‘phony’ 
action, it postulates a ‘constituent judgment’, which, even without any agreement between 
the parties, forces the ‘promisee’ (i.e. the injured party) to accept the blood-money proposed 
and paid by the ‘promisor’ (i.e. the offender), and / or a judgment which even determines 
the amount of the blood-price (what is neither attested nor foreshadowed in the poems). 
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refuse’)62 is a verb that openly introduces the contents of the ‘defence’ of the 
aggrieved party and involves by implication its ‘counterclaim’: that means 
that the victim’s relative is also a ‘substantive claimant’, i.e. the party whose 
self-help has been interrupted by a formal grievance that introduces a judi-
cial procedure aimed at obtaining the pronounce of a court order which, after 
the ﬁnding of facts, either deﬁnitively requires the defendant to refrain from 
avenging, or, if against the claimant, leaves the former to retaliate against the 
latter63. In other words, two parties compete (the killer as a formal claimant 
vs. the victim’s relative as a formal defendant); two claims are diametrically 
opposed to each other and only one between these two opposed claims will 
Against the interpretation recently put forward by THÜR, 2007, p. 190 («der eine war bereit zu 
schwören»), see MAFFI, 2007, p. 198, on the ground of TAUSEND, 2001, and PERPILLOU, 1972. 
See D Schol. Hom., Il. 18.499-500 (Heyne): EÜceto. Nàn diwr…zeto. D»mJ pifaÚskwn. Tù 
koinù pantˆ deiknÝj kaˆ ™mfan…zwn. 
62 Criticizing at length this opinio seems to me pointless (for a recent revival, see VAN EF-
FENTERRE, 1994). Indeed, in the light of the previous considerations (see, supra, p. 239 nt. 61), the 
thesis followed by those scholars who, believing that eÜcomai in a procedural context stands for 
‘I state to have a right’, as a logical consequence, translate – implicitly or explicitly – ¢na…nomai 
with ‘I deny that the counterparty has the right’, as well as the thesis followed by those scholars 
who, translating eÜcomai with ‘I offer/promise’, accordingly maintain that ¢na…nomai corre-
sponds to ‘I refuse’, are both doomed to collapse automatically, once eÜcomai has been translated 
with ‘I claim’. Moreover, such an interpretation – as already pointed out – implies that the shield 
sketches an example of ‘unfounded action’ (what seems to be very unrealistic in the context of 
the ‘peaceful city’), since the Homeric poems do not attest any substantive right of the offender to 
force the offended party to accept the poin» (see, even if with a different reasoning, CANTARELLA, 
2002, p. 154, 156). See D Schol. Hom., Il. 18.500 (Heyne): 'Ana…neto. 'Aphrne‹to.
63 See BISCARDI, 1982, p. 57: «nella Grecia arcaica … il fenomeno processuale sboccia 
non dall’arbitrato ma dalla legalizzazione dell’autodifesa. Ecco perché la d…kh, nel concreto 
signiﬁcato di ‘azione’, altro non fu nella sua genesi che uno strumento di autodifesa conforme a 
giustizia, onde in caso di resistenza da parte del soggetto passivo la tutela dell’ordine pubblico 
esigeva la pronuncia di un organo giudicante della pÒlij per concedere o negare il nulla osta al 
compimento dell’atto esecutivo. Così la d…kh venne ad essere considerata il mezzo per ottenere, 
se necessario, la pronuncia dell’organo giudicante a sostegno della propria pretesa»; see, more-
over, WOLFF, 1946, p. 131 ff.; GERNET, 1955 c, p. 61 ff.; BISCARDI, 1982, p. 357 and nt. 34-37; 
see, more recently, MAFFI, 2007, p. 200 f. I am persuaded by such a theory: at the same time, it 
is my belief that the party bringing the legal action interrupts the use of self-help started by the 
counterparty, while Wolff assumes – on the ground of inconsistent evidence, indeed – that the 
claimant is the person that starts retaliating. This scholar, as everybody knows, argues that the 
‘defendant’, i.e. the killer, has sought protection against the use of self-help by the ‘claimant’, 
i.e. the victim’s relative; the former has been protected by a powerful member of the society and 
this protection, sanctioned by the community, continues to be provided until the ‘claimant’ wins 
a judgment allowing him to re-start the use of self-help: that is to say that until the claimant 
wins, the community protects the defendant, and the victim’s relative, therefore, intends to pres-
ent the case in court. The reconstruction I put forward seems to better ﬁt with the verses: it does 
not need the hypothetical presence of a powerful protector; it is consistent with the sequence of 
speeches described in v. 499-500.
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be allowed by the judge (the killer: ‘Since, as your debtor, I have already paid 
all, I sue you to obtain a judgment declaring that you have no right to retaliate 
and an injunction refraining you from carrying out any retaliatory act’; the 
victim’s relative: ‘Since, as your creditor, I have not received anything, and so 
you are still my debtor, I have the right to retaliate against you’).
2) A procedure in which ‘one party states that, after settling the matter with 
the opponent, it has already totally performed its own obligation (i.e. to pay 
the previously agreed poin»)’, while ‘the other party refuses to accept any-
thing’ (Gagarin, Sealey) is not convincing, because, even regardless of some 
inexactness as for some translations of the verb ¢na…nomai, ﬁrst of all if the 
dispute had been determined by a contrast between the relatives of the victim, 
then «the trial would have opposed the uncompromising and the compromis-
ing relative, rather than the uncompromising one and the offender»64.
3) If one imagines that the dispute has arisen because, during the execu-
tion of the ‘Wergeld agreement’, the offended party (creditor-promisee of the 
poin») declares that the performance does not conform – on a quality or quan-
tity level – with the originally agreed poin» and, therefore, refuses to accept 
the assets as a whole, then it is absolutely necessary not only to postulate that 
the negotiation has been secret and that the community called to witness the 
64 In these terms, see CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 156 f. Anyway, her criticisms may be strengthened. 
One must underline that GAGARIN, 1981, p. 14 (basically followed by FUSAI, 2006, p. 31 ff. and by 
SEALEY, 1994, p. 103; see, moreover, GAGARIN, 1986, p. 27 ff.) assumes – just quoting Hom., Il. 
18.450, 23.204 – that the only possible epic meaning of ¢na…nomai is ‘to refuse’. This assumption, 
in my opinion, sounds incorrect: ¢na…nomai means ‘I refuse’ only when it is used with the accusa-
tive case (Il. 9.679; Od. 3.265, 4.651; 8.212), while with the inﬁnitive (even if implied) it may also 
assume the meaning ‘I deny’ (Il. 9.116; Od. 14.149). So, once established that eÜcomai stands for 
‘I claim’ (as both Gagarin and Fusai admit), it is natural to believe that the antithesis ‘to claim – to 
refuse’ (in loco of ‘to claim – to object/deny’), from a logical perspective, is implausible, at least 
until one can prove the contrary: and, actually, the hypothetical scenarios imagined by Gagarin to 
demonstrate his own hypothesis represent, in my opinion, insufﬁcient evidence for several reasons. 
Gagarin suggests either the possibility of some disagreement among the relatives of the victim («per-
haps one of them has accepted blood-money but another one does not wish to accept anything, and 
hence a dispute arises between the uncompromising relative and the killer»), or the possibility that 
the two litigants «really engaged in bargaining about the amount of blood-money acceptable to the 
relatives; the killer has already paid (or deposited with a third party) the amount normally paid in 
such cases, but the relatives think this is not enough and are seeking a larger payment», so that «the 
relatives adopt as a bargaining position a refusal to accept anything, and the two parties’ inability to 
agree on a sum forces them to resort to others for a settlement of their dispute» (GAGARIN, 1986, p. 
33). Gagarin’s thesis, in general, postulates both the arbitration theory (what is not uncontroversial) 
and the court’s power to impose the acceptance of the blood-price (what is, on the ground of our 
sources, as just stated, indemonstrable); in particular, it is unconvincing since the ﬁrst alternative ﬁts 
better with a dispute opposing two members both belonging to the victim’s family (as already under-
lined in the text), while the second one is clearly vitiated by the belief of the existence of a valuable 
amount which was normally paid in such cases. 
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payment of the poin» ignored the terms of the agreement, but also to make ei-
ther the nexus eÜcesqai + p£nt’ ¢podoànai mean ‘to claim to have brought 
everything with a view to the full performance’ (as Fusai manifestly believes), 
or the nexus mhdn + ˜lšsqai mean ‘to have received everything’ (as Can-
tarella and Thür, implicitly, need to accept)65: what is, even on the semantic 
level, quite difﬁcult.
4) The met¦ to‹si nexus (usually interpreted as a partitive complement 
by those who believe that the two talents should go to one of the gšrontej 
and that, therefore, d…khn e„pe‹n means ‘to judge’ and is synonymous with 
the normal sense of dik£zein)66, in the presence of a verbum dicendi, can be 
65 As for Fusai’s hypothetical reconstruction («la parte offesa dichiara che i beni presentati 
non corrispondono alla poin» pattuita … e pertanto si riﬁuta di prendere anche solo uno dei beni 
esposti e pronti per la consegna»: FUSAI, 2006, p. 126 ff.; see, for further criticisms, MAFFI, 2006), 
it may be divided in four pre-trial stages: 1) secret agreement determining the amount of the 
blood-price; 2) public exhibition of the blood-price on behalf of the debtor (i.e. the murderer); 3) 
performance refused by the creditor (i.e. the victim’s relative), as being ‘partial performance’; 4) 
defense of the debtor (who assumes, against the creditor, to have fulﬁlled). This theory (basically 
grounded on the ‘partial performance’ of the debtor’s obligation and on the creditor’s refusal) 
implies that the murderer’s plea is necessarily preceded by the counterparty’s compliant, i.e. – as 
in Wolff – the murderer (debtor) is the defendant and the victim’s relative (creditor) is the plaintiff 
(what may be excluded by the ‘silence’ about such conjectural stages, rather than by the sequence 
described in verses 499-500, where the murderer pleads ﬁrst); moreover, the interpretation given 
to the nexus eÜcesqai + p£nt’ ¢podoànai (‘to claim to have brought everything’) sounds wrong 
if considered together with the meaning given to the nexus ¢na…nesqai + mhdn ˜lšsqai, i.e. ‘to 
refuse to receive anything’, since it does not set up a full performance of the ‘contractual obliga-
tion’ (as expected), but it implies just an ‘attempt of fulﬁlment’, given the creditor’s refusal (what 
is impossible to infer from the context and from the normal meaning of the single words). To tell 
the truth, also Cantarella (changing her previous opinion) supposes a ‘partial performance’: the 
scholar, once pointed out that «as well known, the payment of the ransom … was performed in 
public», writes that «it is difﬁcult to imagine two parties disputing tout court whether the pay-
ment had been made. More believably, the dispute could concern the correspondence between 
the agreed amount and the amount in fact received» (CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 156 f.). One simple 
objection may be put forward: since Cantarella rightly thinks that ¢na…nesqai means ‘to deny’, 
her thesis is inexorably vitiated by the presence of the negative pronoun mhdšn which, without a 
doubt, stands for ‘nothing’ and not for ‘all (that has been agreed)’. Similarly, the same criticism 
may be extended to THÜR, 1996, p. 67, who maintains what follows: «considering line 499: ‘the 
one entreated that he had paid everything’, dispute may have arisen for instance about some of a 
number of beasts, the usual ﬁne for killing. Some of them may have been sick or stolen property, 
or have run back to their former owner, or perhaps payment might simply have been partly post-
poned. No dramatic issue at all, but amongst peasants reason enough for a quarrel».
66 Ex plurimis, DARESTE, 1884; LEIST, 1884, p. 131 f.; LEAF, 1902 = 2013, p. 612 f.; GLOTZ, 
1904, p. 128; MAINE, 1908, p. 386; EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 55 nt. 4; WOLFF, 1946, p. 39 f.; KÖSTLER, 
1979, p. 74; contra see HEYNE, 1802, p. 533; SCHÖMANN, 1838, p. 73; LAURENCE, 1879, p. 125 f., 
130; FERRINI, 1881, p. 45; LIPSIUS, 1890, p. 229 f.; BONNER, SMITH, 1930, p. 36; GAGARIN, 1986, 
p. 30; THÜR, 1996, p. 66 (see, moreover, the further bibliography quoted in FUSAI, 2006, p. 58 
ff. and p. 88 f. nt. 15-18). 
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expressed by the phrase ‘in their presence; before them’ (and not by ‘among 
them’), once one notices that in the Iliad this nexus is never referred to parties 
that interact in a dialogue or a debate67.
5) The thesis that assigns the two talents to some member of the court does 
not take into account the entity of the sum, as such, and it considers access 
to the judging function as something that must be remunerated, that is to say 
as something that does not share the logic of the ‘gift’, which is common in 
primitive societies68. 
6) It is quite implausible that within the same, small context, two different 
expressions (d…khn e„pe‹n/dik£zein) are used, at a distance of a few verses from 
one another, to describe the same activity (either by the parties [i.e. to plead; 
causam dicere]69 or by the judge [i.e. to decide, ius dicare]70). More speciﬁ-
cally, as the active diathesis of the verb dik£zein is consistently used either to 
describe the ‘administration of justice’ in the context of a trial, or to indicate the 
‘adjudicatory power’ elsewhere, while the middle passive diathesis dik£zesqai 
is usually used to portray the position taken by opponents and/or challengers71 
67 See Hom., Il. 9.622 f.: to‹si d' ¥r' A‡aj / ¢nt…qeoj Telamwni£dhj met¦ màqon œeipe; 
10.250: tÕn d' e„dÒsi g£r toi taàta met' 'Arge…oij ¢goreÚeij; 22.475 f.: ¿ d' ™peˆ oân œmp-
nuto kaˆ ™j fršna qumÕj ¢gšrqh / ¢mbl»dhn goÒwsa met¦ TrJÍsin œeipen.
68 See, on the economic value the two talents might have at that time, RIDGEWAY, 1888: it 
is deﬁnitely implausible to consider the two talents as the ‘Wergeld’ (see, paradigmatically, 
HEYNE, 1802, p. 533; SCHÖMANN, 1838, p. 72 f.; LIPSIUS, 1890, p. 228 ff.), since the amount 
was too small, as well as one may assume, at the same time, that two talents were «too large 
a sum to be a prize for a judge» (CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 159, who, against GAGARIN, 1986, p. 
31, believes that, each party having deposited one talent, the sum, awarded in its entirety to 
the winning party only, could be conceived as a strong deterrent against ‘vexatious claims’ 
and ‘frivolous defences’). Obviously, once said that, also the analogy hypothetically deemed 
as existing between the two talents and some types of Athenian ‘costs and court fees’, such as 
par£stasij, parakatabol», prutane‹a (see HOFMEISTER, 1880, p. 451; NÄGELSBACH, 1884, 
p. 266; RIDGEWAY, 1888, p. 112), cannot be followed.
69 HEYNE, 1802, p. 533, SCHÖMANN, 1838, p. 73, LAURENCE, 1879, p. 125 f., 130, believe that 
the verb dik£zein in the verse 506, concerning the parties, does not mean ‘to judge’, but ‘to 
plead’ (what is quite impossible: see TALAMANCA, 1979): even in their opinion, thence, dik£zein 
and d…khn e„pe‹n are synonymous, since also the latter phrase must be referred to the proce-
dural activity of the two opponents.
70 See, paradigmatically, MAINE, 1908, p. 386; WOLFF, 1946, p. 39; EDWARDS, 1991, p. 217; 
SPRAGUE BECKER, 1995, p. 112; THÜR, 1996, p. 66.
71 Hom., Il. 1.540-543: t…j d’ aâ toi dolomÁta qeîn sumfr£ssato boul£j; / a„e… toi 
f…lon ™stˆn ™meà ¢pÕ nÒsfin ™Ònta / krupt£dia fronšonta dikazšmen: oÙdš t… pè moi / 
prÒfrwn tštlhkaj e„pe‹n œpoj Ótti no»sVj; 8.430-431: ke‹noj d t¦ § fronšwn ™nˆ qumù 
/ Trws… te kaˆ Danao‹si dikazštw, æj ™pieikšj. Od. 11.541-547: aƒ d’ ¥llai yucaˆ 
nekÚwn katateqnhètwn / ›stasan ¢cnÚmenai, e‡ronto d k»de’ ˜k£sth. / o‡h d’ A‡antoj 
yuc¾ Telamwni£dao / nÒsfin ¢fest»kei, kecolwmšnh e†neka n…khj, / t»n min ™gë n…khsa 
dikazÒmenoj par¦ nhusˆ / teÚcesin ¢mf’ 'AcilÁoj: œqhke d pÒtnia m»thr, / pa‹dej d 
Trèwn d…kasan kaˆ Pall¦j 'Aq»nh; 12.439-441: Ãmoj d’ ™pˆ dÒrpon ¢n¾r ¢gorÁqen 
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(for instance, the claimant, who eÜcetai, and the defendant, who ¢na…netai, 
could be described as two litigants who dik£zontai), I believe that, if dik£zein 
in verse 506 very likely refers to the members of the court (as it is conﬁrmed by 
the scholia vetera)72, then it is necessary to infer that the phrase ‘d…khn e„pe‹n’ 
(v. 508) and the verb ‘dik£zesqai’ are synonyms73.
In secundis, it must be speciﬁed that probably the procedure under consid-
eration is not an ‘arbitration’74, but a ‘compulsory judicial procedure’75: my 
opinion is based, more than on the public and formal nature characterizing 
the composite procedural scene described by the poet, on the following logi-
cal observations76. Indeed, if the dispute concerned – as I believe – a quaestio 
facti (so that the panel composed by the gšrontej would be called to deter-
mine whether the poin» had been paid in full), a voluntary agreement to settle 
the matter through arbitration would be quite improbable, as the lying party 
would not have been willing to agree to it. Moreover, it is not quite reliable 
that he who believes to have the right to exact revenge for the murder voluntar-
ily accepts to interrupt the exercise of such a right, whether the issue brought 
to the court were a de facto question or not: moreover, in the latter case, the 
judgment would be focused on the existence of the right, on the part of the of-
fender, to compel the offended party to accept the blood-price in place of the 
use of self-help; but such a circumstance is never attested in Homer. Finally, 
the verse 501 with its «natural implication»77 (that is ‘both demanded a deci-
¢nšsth / kr…nwn ne…kea poll¦ dikazomšnwn a„zhîn, / tÁmoj d¾ t£ ge doàra CarÚb-
dioj ™xefa£nqh. Il. 23.573-580: ¢ll’ ¥get’ 'Arge…wn ¹g»torej ºd mšdontej / ™j mšson 
¢mfotšroisi dik£ssate, m¾ d’ ™p’ ¢rwgÍ, / m» potš tij e‡pVsin 'Acaiîn calkocitènwn: 
/ 'Ant…locon yeÚdessi bihs£menoj Menšlaoj / o‡cetai †ppon ¥gwn, Óti oƒ polÝ ce…ronej 
Ãsan / †ppoi, aÙtÕj d kre…sswn ¢retÍ te b…V te. / e„ d’ ¥g’ ™gën aÙtÕj dik£sw, ka… m’ 
oÜ tin£ fhmi / ¥llon ™pipl»xein Danaîn: „qe‹a g¦r œstai. On these sources, see TALA-
MANCA, 1979.
72 Schol. Hom., Il. 18.506 d (Erbse): ¢moibhdˆj d d…kazon: ½toi ™k diadocÁj oƒ dikastaˆ 
™kaqšzonto, par¦ mšroj tÕ ›n pr©gma dik£zontej, kaˆ ›kastoj tÕ kaq’ ˜autÕn ™n mšrei 
¢pefa…neto. D Schol. Hom., Il. 18.506 (Heyne): 'Amoibhdˆj d' ™d…kazon. 'En mšrei d ¢koÚon-
tej ™d…kazon. Ó ™sti kat¦ ™nallag¾n ¢pofa…nwn t¾n ˜autoà gnèmhn ›kastoj. 
73 See PELLOSO, 2012, p. 110 ff., 128 nt. 63; cf. HEYNE, 1802, p. 533; SCHÖMANN, 1838, p. 73; 
DÖDERLIN, 1863, p. 168; THONISSEN, 1875, p. 27 f.; FERRINI, 1881, p. 45; NÄGELSBACH, 1884, p. 
266; LIPSIUS, 1890, p. 225 ff., 229; LAURENCE, 1879, p. 126; BUSOLT, 1920, p. 333 nt. 33; BONNER, 
SMITH, 1930, p. 39 f.; WESTRUP, 1939, 87 nt. 1; CANTARELLA, 1972, p. 259 f.; 2002, p. 159 f. See, 
paradigmatically, in this sense, Theogn. 1.687.
74 See, in this sense, HOMMEL, 1969 = 1988, p. 46 ff.; GAGARIN, 1973, p. 31, 42 f.; STAHL, 
1987, p. 167; ff.; PAPAKONSTANTINOU, 2008, p. 32 ff. 
75 See, paradigmatically, WOLFF, 1946, p. 34 ff.; THÜR, 1970; HARRISON, 1971, p. 69-72; 
TALAMANCA, 1979, p. 110; SEALEY, 1994, p. 100; THÜR, 1996; CANTARELLA, 2002. 
76 For a useful survey of the precedent literature, see FUSAI, 2006.
77 See GAGARIN, 1986, p. 27 f. Also for Hommel the verse 501 can only be understood as 
a voluntary submission to arbitration: disputes were settled only by compromise; indeed each 
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sion’) is erroneously overestimated and does not postulate a fully voluntary 
submission of the dispute to an arbiter: indeed, nobody can deny that also a 
defendant – even if he is not the party that has taken the legal action – intends 
to obtain a judgment (obviously against the claimant). Notwithstanding the 
numerous, still obscure, issues, it is clear in my opinion that the hypothesis of 
an arbitration with regard to Achilles’ shield denounces in a manifest way the 
«absolute lack of any consideration whatsoever – at a sociological level – of 
the needs the law is called to satisfy and of the consequent impacts»78.
Thus, in the light of the previous remarks, it is plausible that the gšrontej 
are asked to express their authoritative opinion (dik£zein) on the veracity of 
the formal claimant’s allegations, or of the facts opposed by the formal de-
fendant: to sum up, has the a‡desij-contract been performed, or has not it79? 
litigant had to meet his opponent half-way, choosing from amongst several settlements put 
forward by the gšrontej, so that the dispute was deﬁnitely settled once the parties accepted 
one of the proffered settlements (HOMMEL, 1969 = 1988). The thesis is illogical: «how can the 
method of dispute settlement he assumes work if each plaintiff compromises, whether right or 
wrong, and more or less automatically obtains a half of what he demands, for simultaneously 
the defendant loses to the same extent?» (THÜR, 1996, p. 67; cf. THÜR, 1970; 1989).
78 See TALAMANCA, 1979, p. 110 nt. 15, who imperatively qualiﬁes this approach in terms 
of «assoluta mancanza di qualsiasi considerazione – al livello sociologico – dei bisogni a cui il 
diritto deve soddisfare e dei condizionamenti che ne derivano».
79 Once speciﬁed that the so called a‡desij-contract is a bargain where the payment of the 
poin» is ‘consideration’ given in return of the refraining from the use of self-help; once as-
sumed that any reconstruction based on the hypothesis of a ‘partial performance’ of the contract 
cannot be followed (contra CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 156 f., and FUSAI, 2006, p. 126 ff.; cf. THÜR, 
1996, p. 67); once assumed that the dialectics between the two litigants as sketched in the shield 
may be described in terms of dispute between a ‘claim [implying in se a defence]’ and a ‘de-
fence [implying in se a counterclaim]’, both concerning – symmetrically and oppositely – just 
a ‘question of fact’ (contra GAGARIN, 1986, p. 27 ff.); once assumed that, as for the formation 
of a ‘blood-money agreement’ (a‡desij), this act requires a prescribed public form to be valid, 
as well as the fulﬁlment of the obligation (consisting in the payment of the poin») requires to 
be carried out in public (see GAGARIN, 1986, p. 31 f.; CANTARELLA, 2002, p. 156; MAFFI, 2006; 
see, moreover, THÜR, 1996, p. 67, who puts forward some doubts); once assumed that, after 
the judicial ﬁnding of facts, the deﬁnitive judgment may be, alternatively, either for the claim-
ant (i.e. an injunction to refrain the victim’s relatives from retaliating, grounded on the prior 
judicial declaration of the full payment), or for the defendant (i.e. a leave to proceed with the 
interrupted avenge, grounded on the prior judicial declaration of the non-performance); once 
assumed all this, since the dispute depicted in the shield obviously implies that something has 
gone wrong in the relation existing between the two opponents, in my opinion, this is the only 
plausible scenario that can be imagined: 1) a ‘juridical act’ of a‡desij is void, since it has been 
formed secretly and informally; 2) or/and the ‘full performance’ does not take place in public; 
3) the victim’s relatives lay a further (unfounded) claim, assuming to be entitled to act in retalia-
tion, even if they have already received privately the blood-money (on the basis of either a void 
compromise or a valid one); 4) the murderer makes a formal attack on the enforcement of the 
right to use ‘self-help’, by taking a legal action aiming at obtaining a judgment which contains 
both a declaration (the poin» has been paid in full by the debtor, who is the formal claimant) 
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In such a context d…kh (v. 508) is not other than a noun which synthetically 
identiﬁes either the claim of the plaintiff or the answer of the defendant, or 
rather a noun which implies the substantive content of the pleadings of the par-
ties, the substantive reason which founds each ‘judicial act’: it is not the judg-
ment or the arbitration award. In other words, ‘d…khn e„pe‹n’ does not stand 
for ‘giving a judgment’ or for ‘deciding’ (since, once presupposed a quaestio 
facti whether the poin» was paid or not, which obviously permits only two 
alternative solutions, a competition among the various members of the ‘panel 
of judges’ sounds very unlikely, unless one follows either Thür or Gagarin), 
but for ‘stating the right’80. This is conﬁrmed by the scholia vetera, according 
to which the two talents should be awarded to the party that expresses its own 
reasons (d…khn) verbally (e‡poi) in the straightest way („qÚntata), that is to 
say in the most truthful way81. Already at the beginning of the Greek legal 
experience, a ‘well-founded claim’ and the ‘right of action’ seem to merge in 
a monistic view that places the person together with his or her reasons, rather 
than the judge with his authority, at the centre of the system. 
So, it might be useful both to compare this passage with the verses describ-
ing Minos as judge of the dead and depicting him with the insignia of regal 
tim»82, and to confront it with the implications suggested by some verses in 
and an injunction (the victim’s relative, who is the formal defendant, is not allowed to carry 
out any retaliation act against the murderer). See ROLLINGER, 2004, on the symbolism of the 
elements of the contract-procedure, as well as on the ceremonial way of behaviour (compared 
with analogous cases derived from the Orient, which is considered by the scholar the original 
historical ‘sample’ for the Homeric ‘Vertragspraxis’; contra the approach implied in this work, 
see THÜR, 2006, p. 35 nt. 36).
80 As I have already written, even if one interprets d…khn e„pe‹n in terms of ius dicere and 
‘met¦ to‹si’ as meaning ‘among them’, «possono essere sviluppate alcune considerazioni dello 
stesso Wolff, secondo cui se è vero che i due talenti vanno a chi ‘dà un giudizio’ (e più precisa-
mente a quello dei gšrontej che avesse dato il verdetto ritenuto giusto dalla folla), altrettanto 
vero è che d…khn e„pe‹n, quale sinonimo di dik£zein (giudicare), deve essere inteso come ‘to 
say what is right’ ossia, in buona sostanza, ‘affermare il diritto della parte’» (PELLOSO, 2012, p. 
129 nt. 63, in the light of WOLFF, 1946, p. 40, who refers the phrase to the judge stating autho-
ritatively in his deﬁnitive pronounce ‘what is right’; see, moreover, PATTARO, 2005, p. 291, who 
translates dik£zein with «to state the right»).
81 See D Schol. Hom., Il. 18.497 (Heyne): ”Enqa d ne‹koj çrèrei. 'Efilone…koun, 
ºmfisb»toun. dikast»rion e„s£gei dÚo tinîn ¢ndrîn. ïn Ð mn ™gkaloÚmenoj, 
¢podedwkšnai lÚtra Øpr toà pefoneumšnou fhs…: Ð d ™gkalîn, œlege m¾ e„lhfšnai. 
dÚo d t£lanta crusoà katšqento, éste tÕn ¢pode…xanta tÕ ¢lhqj labe‹n ¢mfÒte-
ra. poinÁj oân lšgei tÁj kaloumšnhj par¦ to‹j 'Attiko‹j, ØpofÒnia, § ™d…dosan to‹j 
o„ke…oij tîn ¢nVrhmšnwn oƒ ¢nelÒntej. lšgetai d koinîj p©sa ¢ntšktisij, poin». 
82 Hom., Od. 11.568-571: œnq’ Ã toi M…nwa ‡don, DiÕj ¢glaÕn uƒÒn, / crÚseon skÁp-
tron œconta qemisteÚonta nškussin, / ¼menon: oƒ dš min ¢mfˆ d…kaj e‡ronto ¥nakta, / 
¼menoi ˜staÒtej te, kat’ eÙrupulj ”Adoj dî (on these verses, see amplius PELLOSO, 2012, 
p. 59 nt. 141; p. 80 nt. 195; p. 85 nt. 206; p. 86 nt. 207; p. 90 nt. 217; p. 105 nt. 3; p. 109 nt. 13; 
p. 121 nt. 138; p. 127 nt. 58; p. 129 nt. 63; p. 134 nt. 72; p. 140 nt. 11; p. 143 nt. 18; p. 160; p. 
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the fourth Homeric hymn, despite the experimental nature of such an analy-
sis83. Coming in front of Minos and staying around the king himself (oƒ dš 
min ¢mfˆ … ¥nakta), the dead e‡ronto d…kaj, that is to say they ‘exposed 
their reasons’ (imperfect indicative from e‡rw, i.e. ‘I declare, I state, I tell, I 
speak’; rather than of œromai, ‘I ask’)84 as mentioned by the scholiast, who 
uses dik£zesqai and lšgein in his paraphrase85. The hymn tells about the 
dispute arisen between Apollon and Hermes: the latter, as everybody knows, 
steals the former’s cattle, hides them in a cave, and slaughters two of them. 
Apollon then inquires about his cattle and accuses of theft the brother. The god 
of the sun, after an extra-judicial ‘oath-challenge’ (that is an ‘Eidesangebot’) 
proposed by Hermes by way of a prÒklhsij86, relies on being immediately 
entitled to self-help, assuming to have been injured by the brother and to have 
suffered a damage; ﬁnally, by seizing Hermes and carrying him off, Apollon 
initiates to levy ‘execution on the person of the opponent himself’ (i.e. to pro-
ceed with a direct ‘enforcement of his own right’, even in absence of a judi-
cial title empowering to levy execution). But, at that point, Hermes interrupts 
the execution: he makes an attack on Apollon’s self-help by raising a ‘formal 
objection’ against the legitimacy of the enforcement proceeding, what is, sub-
stantially, a ‘statement of claim’ involved in an action for a declaratory judg-
ment (given by Zeus) against the brother and for a relief, such as an injunction 
which refrains the defendant from ‘proceeding in executivis’: indeed, Apollon 
is asked to give (dÒj) his own d…kh before Zeus (that is to state his own right, 
his own reason, as a formal ‘defendant’) and – from an adversarial concep-
tion of the judicial process focused on the right of controverting – to accept 
(dšxo) the one Hermes will give to him (that is, in the opposite sense, to hear 
the opposed reasons maintained by the formal ‘plaintiff’, even ready to swear 
170; cf. SCHÖMANN, 1838, p. 72; DÖDERLIN, 1863, p. 167; THONISSEN, 1875, p. 28 nt. 3; LIPSIUS, 
1890, p. 229 f.; BUSOLT, 1920, p. 333 nt. 3; CANTARELLA, 1972, p. 260; OSTWALD, 1973, p. 677; 
RUDHARDT, 1999, p. 104 ff.). The analogy with Hom., Il. 18.508, in my opinion, makes not much 
persuasive the following interpretations: STANFORD, 1948, ad Hom., Od. 11.570 (who believes 
that the dead are «inquiring about precedents, decisions»); GAGARIN, 1973, p. 85 and 1986, p. 
33 (who translates d…kai with «settlements» or «procedure for settling dispute peacefully, legal 
process», and is followed by PAPAKONSTANTINOU, 2008, p. 148 nt. 24); JANIK, 2000, p. 30 (that 
interprets d…kai in terms of «decision», «verdict»).
83 Hom., Hymn. 4.312: dÕj d d…khn kaˆ dšxo par¦ Zhnˆ Kron…wni.
84 See, in a similar fashion, Hom., Il. 1.513, 2.49, 23.226; Od. 2.162, 13.7, 11.137. On this 
point, see FUSAI, 2006, p. 88 and nt. 15, p. 176 and nt. 27.
85 Schol. Hom., Od. 11.570 Dindorf: e‡ronto: ¢ntˆ toà œlegon: Óqen kaˆ ƒr£ ¹ ™kklhs…a. 
¥loga: kaq»menoj g¦r oÙdeˆj dik£zetai.
86 MAFFI, 2007, p. 242 ff. (who sums up Gagarin’s and Thür’s interpretations: GAGARIN, 
1986, p. 40 f.; 1997, p. 132; 2005, p. 89; THÜR, 1996, p. 60; 2006, p. 41 nt. 50). On this topic 
(above all on Hermes’ sophistry in formulating both oaths proposed: v. 274-276, 383-389), see, 
moreover, FLETCHER, 2008.
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an exculpatory oath)87. I am conﬁdent that the noun at issue cannot be given 
the technical connotation of either ‘verdict’ or ‘dispute submitted to arbitra-
tion’88. These interpretations, indeed, do not match the double imperative used 
by Hermes (who is neither proposing an arbitration, nor pronouncing a judg-
ment, but rather performing a ‘private interdictum’ which is the introductory 
act of the primitive process); moreover, they do not take into a due account the 
scenario implied, what is very far from being a possible factual antecedent of 
a dispute voluntarily submitted to arbitration for a friendly settlement. Thence 
it is possible – as I imagine – to think of a ‘compulsory legal process’ (even 
though roughly simpliﬁed in the ﬁction sketched in the hymn), the beginning 
of which is a formal legal action against the enforcement already started by the 
counterparty for the immediate and direct satisfaction of its right89. 
87 Hom., Hymn. 4.379-383 (see THÜR, 1996, p. 60).
88 FRISCH, 1976, p. 46; GAGARIN, 1986, p. 41; PAPAKONSTANTINOU, 2007, p. 90 f. («Hermes 
proposes to submit the dispute to arbitration with Zeus as the judge»); contra, see OSTWALD, 
1973, p. 676; PELLOSO, 2012, p. 120 f. nt. 37.
89 Also this source (dated at the end of the sixth century B.C.: JANKO, 1982, p. 140 ff., 143; 
VERGADOS, 2011, p. 82 f.), in my opinion, strengthens Wolff’s theory (WOLFF, 1946). Neither legal 
procedure derives – logically and historically – from the voluntary submission to arbitration, nor it 
is a ‘ritualizing’ and a ‘sophistication’ of self-help: in ancient Greece, compulsory legal procedure 
was originally initiated during a direct and immediate enforcement of one’s right (i.e. an execution 
which was not empowered by a previous judicial title), as a ‘formal attack’, an ‘objection’ in the 
form of an action for judicial declaration and injunction against the party asserting to be entitled to 
enforce in executivis its own right (see, supra, p. 239 nt. 61 ff.). What is more, the verse telling that, 
on top of Olympus, ¢mfotšroisi d…khj katškeito t£lanta (Hom., Hymn. 4.324), should also be 
taken into account: aya d tšrqron †konto quèdeoj OÙlÚmpoio / ™j patšra Kron…wna DiÕj 
perikallša tškna: / ke‹qi g¦r ¢mfotšroisi d…khj katškeito t£lanta; the traditional version 
runs as follows: «soon they came, these lovely children of Zeus, to the top of fragrant Olympus, to 
their father, the Son of Kronos; for there were the scales of judgment set for them both» (EVELYN-
WHITE, 1914, ad Hom., Hymn. 4.322-324; cf. LIDDELL, SCOTT, 1996, sv. t£lanta, who translate with 
«scales of justice»; ALLEN, HALLIDAY, SIKES, 1963, ad Hom., Hymn. 4.324, who believe that «in that 
case the expression would be metaphorical, for Apollo and Hermes have of course deposited no fees. 
But it is far more probable that the hymnwriter, while possibly imitating the language of Il. 5.507, 
either misunderstood or consciously perverted the meaning of ‘t£lanta’ here; he was, no doubt, 
familiar with the other sense of the word = scales»; furthermore, see NOTARI, 2005: «the idiom of the 
scales of justice is well-known, its use is widely spread, Iustitia can frequently be seen with scales 
in her hand in different representations. The scales as the symbol of justice and administration of 
justice can be encountered in various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest instances can be 
found in the Homeric Hermes’s Hymn»). In my opinion, this reconstruction underestimates the sug-
gestions that might hypothetically stem from the comparison of the episode with the trial scene on 
the shield: t£lanta, in a trial setting, may indicate a sum of money paid by the parties; the ke‹sqai 
compounds, in a legal setting, show the creation of a security; nothing prevents from interpreting 
¢mfotšroij as a ‘dative of agent’. In the light of these remarks, therefore, one can plausibly (if not 
deﬁnitely) maintain that the claimant, in the presence of Zeus, had to depose t£lanta: this sum 
both represented a kind of fee, the payment of which was aimed at discouraging frivolous pleadings 
before a judge, and, at the same time, a ‘private penalty’ to the advantage of the winning party at the 
end of the process (see, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 120 f. nt. 37).
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5. D…kh beyond the trial: litigious scenarios and non-contentious contexts.
If d…kh is the ‘reason’ exposed by a party during a legal process, Homer 
attests many other examples of the use of this noun, both in the context of a 
non-judicial litigation, and with regard to ‘non-contentious’ relations. If one 
considers the out-of-court cases involving the concept of d…kh, ﬁrst of all, the 
two following episodes from the Iliad are worth mentioning. In the so called 
book of reconciliation, Odysseus declares that the payment of ¥poina by Ag-
amemnon, together with the return of the items illicitly subtracted, the oath 
of denial and the sealing of the settlement with a rich banquet is to be made 
†na m» ti d…khj ™pideuj œcVsqa90, that is to say so that the injury suffered 
by Achilles is healed and his d…kh (subjective sphere) fully reinstated91. In the 
book of the chariot race, the d…kh of Antilochus is potentially injured by Achil-
les’ determination to attribute the second prize to Eumelus (who ﬁnished last 
because of divine intervention) which by rights should have been attributed 
to Nestor’s son. Antilochus, therefore, opposes Achilles by stating his own 
‘reason’, founded in the objective results of the race92.
As for the Odyssey, several verses can be quoted. It is true that the main 
sense of d…kh is coupled – but only in one hapax that in any case reﬂects a 
compound of the noun – with the secondary one of sentence and judgment 
(eÙdik…a)93, even though the sense of ‘personal sphere’ prevails (as for non-
90 Hom., Il. 19.178-180: kaˆ d soˆ aÙtù qumÕj ™nˆ fresˆn †laoj œstw. / aÙt¦r œpeit£ 
se daitˆ ™nˆ klis…Vj ¢res£sqw / pie…rV, †na m» ti d…khj ™pideuj œcVsqa.
91 I do not agree with those who translate either with «Agamemnon accomplira ses promesses, 
parce que la justice l’exige» (VATIN, 1982, p. 276), or with «so that you (Achilles) may lack nothing of 
your settlement» (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 85: «d…kh itself retains its basic meaning of ‘ruling, settlement’, 
though this meaning is extended in various ways. First of all, in Hom., Il. 19.180, after Agamemnon 
and Achilles are reconciled, Odysseus bids the former give the latter a feast as well as the many gifts, 
‘so that you (Achilles) may lack nothing of your settlement’. Here d…kh as ‘settlement’ takes on the 
meaning of ‘what is owed someone as a result of a settlement’»). See, on these verses, EHRENBERG, 
1921, p. 55; WOLF, 1950, p. 85 ff.; NAGY, 1979, p. 128 f.; YAMAGATA, 1994, p. 63.
92 Hom., Il. 23.539-542: •Wj œfaq’, o‰ d’ ¥ra p£ntej ™pÇneon æj ™kšleue. / ka… nÚ kš 
oƒ pÒren †ppon, ™pÇnhsan g¦r 'Acaio…, / e„ m¾ ¥r’ 'Ant…locoj megaqÚmou Nšstoroj uƒÕj / 
Phle…dhn 'AcilÁa d…kV ºme…yat’ ¢nast£j. For these verses, on the one hand, see FRISCH, 
1976, p. 46 (who believes that d…kh stands for «legal proceding»), and GAGARIN, 1973, p. 84 
(who translates it with «proposed settlement», substantially followed by ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 
177); on the other hand, see FUSAI, 2006, p. 146; cf. LIPSIUS, 1890, p. 229 ff.; EHRENBERG, 1921, 
p. 56; GIOFFREDI, 1962, p. 74; JANIK, 2000, p. 21; PENTA, 2000, p. 681; PELLOSO, 2012, p. 118 (all 
more inclined to interpret d…kh in a substantive and subjective way). Cf., moreover, PAZDERNIK, 
1976, p. 73, who interprets here d…kh as iustitia distributiva (as well as in Hom., Il. 19.180).
93 Hom., Od. 19.106-111: t¾n d' ¢pameibÒmenoj prosšfh polÚmhtij `OdusseÚj: / ð 
gÚnai, oÙk ¥n t…j se brotîn ™p' ¢pe…rona ga‹an / neikšoi: Ã g£r seu klšoj oÙranÕn 
eÙrÝn ƒk£nei, / éj tš teu Ã basilÁoj ¢mÚmonoj, Ój te qeoud¾j / ¢ndr£sin ™n pollo‹si 
kaˆ „fq…moisin ¢n£sswn / eÙdik…aj ¢nšcVsi.
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litigation contexts, the following nuances are found: right, power, expecta-
tion, fate, allotted part). Besides the already mentioned verses dedicated to 
Minos and to the dead’s d…kai, those describing the Cyclopic civilisation are 
also relevant. A Cyclops, in primis, is deﬁned as an ¢qšmistoj, that is to say 
‘he who denies any superior order’ (he who does not recognise qšmistej, he 
who qemisteÚei on women and children without any divine mandate, makes 
sacriﬁces to the gods only for his own proﬁt and has no ¢gora…); moreover, 
he is considered Øperf…aloj, Øperb…oj, oÙ d…kaioj, oÙ filoxe‹noj, ¥gri-
oj (a savage who performs violent behaviours damaging the tim» of others, 
whose acts are characterized by excessive b…h since he does not observe the 
rules of hospitality and carries out the most heinous of crimes in annihilating 
the subjectivity of others through anthropophagy)94. Now, I think that one 
should compare the verse in which the Cyclopes are called at the same time 
Øperf…aloi and ¢qšmistej95 with the parallel one in which Polyphemus is 
said not to know ‘d…kai and qšmistej’96: if Øperf…aloi (equal to oÙ d…kai-
oi) is an adjective that synthetically describes the excesses in horizontal rela-
tionships97, and ¢qšmistej describes – as for the vertical relationships – the 
breach of the theo-physical order98, then saying that Polyphemus neglects 
both d…kai and qšmistej may imply that he violates the subjective and sub-
stantive sphere of human beings, as well as the dictates of the gods and the 
nature99. In light of this, the interpretation that translates d…kai and qšmistej 
with ‘justice’ seems, at best, generic100; the one that refers to human and di-
vine rules seems arbitrary (as in Homer there is no space for human rules)101; 
and the one that contrasts the qšmistej (formulae – formularies) with the 
94 Hom., Od. 9.106, 9.175, 9.187; see, moreover, Od. 9.107-115, 9.215-217, 9.259-271, 9.277-
278, 9.347. Cf. HIRZEL, 1907, p. 26, 166; EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 14; CANTARELLA, 1983, p. 95.
95 Hom., Od. 9.106-115: Kuklèpwn d’ ™j ga‹an Øperfi£lwn ¢qem…stwn / ƒkÒmeq’, o† ·a 
qeo‹si pepoiqÒtej ¢qan£toisin / oÜte futeÚousin cersˆn futÕn oÜt’ ¢rÒwsin, / ¢ll¦ t£ 
g’ ¥sparta kaˆ ¢n»rota p£nta fÚontai, / puroˆ kaˆ kriqaˆ ºd’ ¥mpeloi, a† te fšrousin / 
onon ™rist£fulon, ka… sfin DiÕj Ômbroj ¢šxei. / to‹sin d’ oÜt’ ¢goraˆ boulhfÒroi oÜte 
qšmistej, / ¢ll’ o† g’ Øyhlîn Ñršwn na…ousi k£rhna / ™n spšesi glafuro‹si, qemisteÚei 
d ›kastoj / pa…dwn ºd’ ¢lÒcwn, oÙd’ ¢ll»lwn ¢lšgousi. 
96 Hom., Od. 9.213-215: aÙt…ka g£r moi Ñsato qumÕj ¢g»nwr / ¥ndr’ ™peleÚsesqai 
meg£lhn ™pieimšnon ¢lk»n, / ¥grion, oÜte d…kaj eâ e„dÒta oÜte qšmistaj.
97 CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. Øperf…aloj («violente, arrogant»); EBELING, 1963, sv. Øperf…aloj 
(«superbus, insolens»); AUTENRIETH, 1891, sv. Øperf…aloj («overbearing, arrogant, insolent»). 
As for the synonymity existing between Øperf…aloj and Øpšrbioj, see CANTARELLA, 1981.
98 See PELLOSO, 2012, p. 70 ff.
99 On these verses see, amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 121 ff.
100 GIOFFREDI, 1962, p. 73; LO SCHIAVO, 1994, p. 40.
101 OSTWALD, 1973, p. 674 f.; MITTICA, 1996, p. 193; ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 176; BOUVIER, 
2003, p. 249.
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d…kai as ‘litigation procedure in general’ (or as ‘justice’, but in the only 
sense of ‘procedures’) is totally unfounded102.
In the Odyssey, moreover, the most relevant semantic ﬁeld offers new shades. 
In primis, the noun should be translated as ‘that which is due’ in the verses in 
which Eumeus declares that servants are fated to live with the few resources 
available to them, always fearing that new lords shall replace the old ones, be-
cause this is their d…kh103; and also in the verses where Telemachus, speaking to 
the father he has not recognised yet, says that it is the d…kh of gšrontej to rest 
peacefully104. In the passage in which Penelope complains that her suitors never 
had the d…kh to devour the riches of others, but they were to compete with each 
other in bringing presents, cattle, goats, and organizing banquets, the noun at is-
sue should again be interpreted as ‘that which is due’105. And this is the meaning 
of d…kh when Odysseus, in front of his wife, states that the d…kh of a man who 
is far away from his home-land is to suffer when he is asked to say from where 
he comes106, and also where it is afﬁrmed that the d…kh of mankind is to die and 
have the body decomposed107. In secundis, the sign d…kh can be translated with 
its nuance of power (de facto) when Penelope underscores that if kings are used 
to choose their friends and enemies arbitrarily and oppress the people (as that 
is their d…kh), Odysseus never acted this way108. Finally, d…kh can be translated 
102 GAGARIN, 1973, p. 86 («many settlements»; «‘litigation procedure in general’»; see, more-
over, LÉVY, 1998, p. 76; HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 136, 180).
103 Hom., Od. 14.57-61: prÕj g¦r DiÒj e„sin ¤pantej / xe‹no… te ptwco… te. dÒsij d’ Ñl…gh 
te f…lh te / g…netai ¹metšrh: ¹ g¦r dmèwn d…kh ™st…n, / a„eˆ deidiÒtwn, Ót’ ™pikratšwsin 
¥naktej / oƒ nšoi … .
104 Hom., Od. 24.249-255: aÙtÒn s’ oÙk ¢gaq¾ komid¾ œcei, ¢ll’ ¤ma gÁraj / lugrÕn œceij 
aÙcme‹j te kakîj kaˆ ¢eikša ›ssai. / oÙ mn ¢erg…hj ge ¥nax ›nek’ oÜ se kom…zei, / oÙdš t… 
toi doÚleion ™pipršpei e„sor£asqai / edoj kaˆ mšgeqoj: basilÁi g¦r ¢ndrˆ œoikaj. / toioÚtJ 
d œoiken, ™peˆ loÚsaito f£goi te, / eØdšmenai malakîj: ¹ g¦r d…kh ™stˆ gerÒntwn.
105 Hom., Od. 18.274-280: ¢ll¦ tÒd’ a„nÕn ¥coj krad…hn kaˆ qumÕn ƒk£nei: / mnhst»rwn oÙc 
¼de d…kh tÕ p£roiqe tštukto, / o† t’ ¢gaq»n te guna‹ka kaˆ ¢fneio‹o qÚgatra / mnhsteÚein 
™qšlwsi kaˆ ¢ll»lois’ ™r…swsin: / aÙtoˆ to… g’ ¢p£gousi bÒaj kaˆ ‡fia mÁla / koÚrhj 
da‹ta f…loisi, kaˆ ¢gla¦ dîra didoàsin: / ¢ll’ oÙk ¢llÒtrion b…oton n»poinon œdousin.
106 Hom., Od. 19.164-170: t¾n d’ ¢pameibÒmenoj prosšfh polÚmhtij `OdusseÚj: / ð gÚnai 
a„do…h Laerti£dew `OdusÁoj, / oÙkšt’ ¢poll»xeij tÕn ™mÕn gÒnon ™xeršousa; / ¢ll’ œk toi 
™ršw. Ã mšn m’ ¢cšess… ge dèseij / ple…osin À œcomai: ¹ g¦r d…kh, ÐppÒte p£trhj / Âj ¢pšVsin 
¢n¾r tÒsson crÒnon Ósson ™gë nàn, / poll¦ brotîn ™pˆ ¥ste’ ¢lèmenoj, ¥lgea p£scwn.
107 Hom., Od. 11.215-222: ìj ™f£mhn, ¹ d’ aÙt…k’ ¢me…beto pÒtnia m»thr: / ê moi, 
tšknon ™mÒn, perˆ p£ntwn k£mmore fwtîn, / oÜ t… se PersefÒneia DiÕj qug£thr ¢paf…
skei, / ¢ll’ aÛth d…kh ™stˆ brotîn, Óte t…j ke q£nVsin. / oÙ g¦r œti s£rkaj te kaˆ Ñstša 
nej œcousin, / ¢ll¦ t¦ mšn te purÕj kraterÕn mšnoj a„qomšnoio / damn´, ™pe… ke prîta 
l…pV leÚk’ Ñstša qumÒj, / yuc¾ d’ ºät’ Ôneiroj ¢poptamšnh pepÒthtai.
108 Hom., Od. 4.686-693: o‰ q£m’ ¢geirÒmenoi b…oton katake…rete pollÒn, / ktÁsin 
Thlem£coio dafronoj. oÙdš ti patrîn / Ømetšrwn tÕ prÒsqen ¢koÚete, pa‹dej ™Òntej, / 
oŒoj `OdusseÝj œske meq’ Ømetšroisi tokeàsin, / oÜte tin¦ ·šxaj ™xa…sion oÜte ti e„pën / 
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as ‘power’ in the scene where Odysseus explains to his son the miracle of the 
light produced by Athena, that illuminates the walls and the architraves of the 
palace, as an expression of the d…kh of the gods109.
6. ‘Stating the straightest d…kh’; ‘selecting rules for straight d…kai’; 
 d…kh as a ‘personal sphere’; d…kh as a ‘principle’.
 
If all this is right, then I believe it is unlikely that the same verb dik£zein 
can also have a generic meaning of ‘judging’, that is ‘giving a judgment’ 
(both in a legal and in a non-legal context)110. In my opinion, as well as the 
middle-passive voice ‘dik£zesqai’ is a synonym of d…khn e„pe‹n, the ac-
tive voice ‘dik£zein’ can be interpreted as ‘declaring which reason (d…khn) 
is well-founded’, with a clear semantic and conceptual pre-eminence of the 
‘substantive rights’ of the parties on the authoritative act, even though the 
Homeric context and the etymology do not offer a clear view of the methods 
(either argumentative or irrational) followed to reach the ﬁnal decision on the 
dispute. Therefore, rebus sic stantibus, it is not clear whether the judgment 
(here interpreted as a ‘Sachurteil’) is (1) either the direct result of the judge’s 
‘intime convinction’ (i.e. the free evaluation of the evidence introduced in the 
legal process), as Hom., Il. 18.506 (¢moibhdˆj d d…kazon) seems to suggest 
by implying a ‘public statement of reasons’ – rather than, as commonly as-
sumed, a plurality of ‘interlocutory sentences’111 – pronounced by each gšrwn; 
™n d»mJ; ¼ t’ ™stˆ d…kh qe…wn basil»wn: / ¥llon k’ ™cqa…rVsi brotîn, ¥llon ke filo…h. / 
ke‹noj d’ oÜ pote p£mpan ¢t£sqalon ¥ndra ™èrgei.
109 Hom., Od. 19.35-43: d¾ tÒte Thlšmacoj prosefèneen Ön patšr’ aya: / ð p£ter, 
Ã mšga qaàma tÒd’ Ñfqalmo‹sin Ðrîmai: / œmphj moi to‹coi meg£rwn kala… te mesÒd-
mai / e„l£tina… te dokoˆ kaˆ k…onej ØyÒs’ œcontej / fa…nont’ Ñfqalmo‹s’ æj e„ purÕj 
a„qomšnoio. / Ã m£la tij qeÕj œndon, o‰ oÙranÕn eÙrÝn œcousi. / tÕn d’ ¢pameibÒmenoj 
prosšfh polÚmhtij `OdusseÚj: / s…ga kaˆ kat¦ sÕn nÒon ‡scane mhd’ ™ršeine: / aÛth toi 
d…kh ™stˆ qeîn, o‰ ”Olumpon œcousin.
110 See AUTENRIETH, 1891, sv. dik£zw; cf. FRISK, 1960, sv. d…kh; CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. d…kh; 
TALAMANCA, 1979, p. 117.
111 See, in this sense, WOLFF, 1946, p. 38 ff. (according to his interpration, each elder de-
cides either for the claimant or for the defendant with a yes or no ‘Sachurteil’, while the people 
chooses the straightest decision, on the ground of the best argumentation); see, also, THÜR, 
1996, p. 60 f. (that, actually, does not exactly determine the content of the supposed ‘Bewei-
surteil’; see, also, THÜR, 2007, p. 190). Moreover, in Carlier’s opinion «three institutions are 
mentioned as taking part in the trial. The laoi, divided into two groups of opposed supporters, 
listen to the discussion and shout loudly in favour of one or the other litigant; the elders express 
their opinion one after another; the istor says which of the elders has given the better advice, 
and consequently which of the litigants is right. The text does not say that the istor is a king, 
but his role is exactly parallel to the role the king plays in political discussion. In both cases, 
the decision is reached in the same way: after listening to the elders, in front of the assembled 
people, one man ﬁnally decides» (CARLIER, 2006, p. 106 f.; see, moreover, CARLIER, 1999, p. 
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or (2) a mere authoritative statement the content of which is ipso iure de-
termined by the compelling outcomes of a ‘formal and binding evidentiary 
proceeding’ (for example oaths, ordeals, battles)112. It is true – and nobody can 
deny it – that in the famous passage in which Antilochus and Menelaus face 
each other113, the act of dik£zein performed by the latter takes – as Thür has 
several times underlined114, and as the scholiast himself implicitly acknowl-
278 ff.). CULTRARO, 2009, p. 138, both following Carlier’s reconstruction and comparing PY 
Ep 704 with the judicial scene depicted in the shield, assumes that «la principale differenza tra 
il sistema normativo della Grecia micenea e quello della società post-palatina risiede proprio 
nel diverso ruolo del da-mo/damos: nel primo caso … questa entità collettiva interviene nella 
contesa, mentre nel sistema omerico si limita ad ascoltare», and that «è un dato saldamente 
acquisito che sia il sovrano – e solo il sovrano – ad avere il potere di trasformare una proposta 
o una richiesta in un’ordinanza esecutiva». Such two assumptions are unfounded: indeed, PY 
Ep 704 only attests – for the Mycenaean age – a particular case where the ‘da-mo’ is a defen-
dant (without mentioning any institutional role regularly played by the ‘people’); afterwards, 
the Homeric lines cannot be used as evidence – for the Iron Age – of the impossibility for the 
people as a whole to be sued.
112 In my opinion, one must reject the reconstruction put forward by Gagarin (GAGARIN, 
1986, p. 26 ff.: each elder, as an arbiter, in competition with the others in the view of a prize, 
proposes a ‘compromise settlement’, and the parties jointly choose the best one for them), since 
this thesis sophisticatedly creates a bulk of artiﬁcial issues to strengthen the arbitration theory 
(what is, generally, very controversial, as well as even impossible in the speciﬁc context of the 
dispute as depicted in the shield) and unlikely denies that the question at issue is a simple quaes-
tio facti (that, indeed, can postulate just two possible clear-cut decisions). One cannot follow 
Thür’s theory (THÜR, 1970; 1996: each elder either proposes a fully new ‘Beweisverfahren’, or 
chooses which oath – one proposed by the plaintiff, one proposed by the defendant – should 
be sworn; see, moreover, LATTE, 1920, p. 8; PRIMMER, 1970), since it suggests an improbable 
meaning of the verb eÜcomai (‘I’m ready to swear’), it maintains the indemonstrable divine 
nature of the ‡stwr, it arbitrarily extends beyond its borders the particular meaning that d…ka-
zein shows (just) in Hom., Il. 23.573-580, and, as concerns the possible contents of the several 
‘Beweisurteile’ proposed by the elders, it postulates an alternative that does not ﬁnd any support 
in the verses. Once said that, and once pointed out that the only possible judgment, since the 
question involved in the process is a quaestio facti, is a ‘yes or no’ decision (CANTARELLA, 2002), 
as well as that the gšrontej, as members of a ‘panel of judges’ having seisin of the case, likely 
give one ﬁnal judgment, then, Hom., Il. 18.506 can be read as attesting: 1) the existence of a 
system where each gšrwn pronounces in public his own ‘statement of reasons’; 2) that ‘dissent-
ing opinions’ were possible; 3) that the principle of ‘intime convinction’ was in force; 4) that the 
ﬁnal judgment was the result of the majority vote. This hypothetical reconstruction contradicts 
entirely WOLFF, 1946, p. 75, who, as everybody knows, believes that dik£zein generally means 
‘to allow or to forbid the use of self-help’ after a formal proof and that it is formalized in the 
«solemn statement of the outcome of the evidence procedure» (see ANDERSEN, 1976); contra, 
moreover, THÜR 2006, p. 48 f., who believes that only at the end of the seventh century a real 
‘Mehrheitsentscheidung’ is actually attested (IG I3.104).
113 Hom., Il. 23.573-580 (see above).
114 «In democratic Athens the magistrates brought the cases before a popular court. By vot-
ing the defendant guilty the jurors opened the way for the private use of force. In contrast, in 
early Greece magistrates did not decide cases themselves. Rather they would formulate an oath 
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edges115 – the shape of a ‘Beweisurteil’116 (while nothing in the verses at issue 
prevents from assuming that the act of dik£zein performed by the Achaean 
chiefs may correspond to a ‘Sachurteil’, even resolving the dispute in a biased 
way in favor of the king). Anyway, maintaining that this verb always implies 
a ‘judicial authoritative statement’ which proposes (or orders) a ‘compelling 
evidentiary procedure’117 that automatically resolves the dispute, in the light 
of all the other Homeric passages, seems to me an excessive and inconsistent 
generalization: as if one would attribute all the particular characteristics of a 
species to a broader genus118. The same reasoning is true for dikaspÒloj (ap-
pellative referred to the sons of the Achaeans and to Telemachus)119: nothing 
prevents this expression from being attributed to the judicial activity aimed 
at protecting any ‘well-founded claim’. Those who interpret the Greek di-
and decide which of the litigants was to submit to taking it … Dikazein in fact means to swear to 
the facts of the case by an appropriate deity, sometimes with the addition of sanctions for falsity. 
If the oath was successfully taken the party swearing won the case and no further judgment was 
necessary … the magistrate does not decide on guilt or innocence but only gives a judgment 
about the oath-formula which, if taken, will automatically resolve the dispute» (THÜR, 1996, p. 
60 f.; see THÜR, 1970, 1989; against this hypothesis, see TALAMANCA, 1979, p. 116; cf., amplius, 
PELLOSO, 2009-2010; 2012, p. 3 f. nt. 5, p. 128 nt. 63).
115 Schol. Hom., Il. 23.579-580: aÙtÕj dik£sw, ka… m’ oÜ tin£ fhmi ¥llon ™pipl»xein 
Danaîn: œdeixen Óti tù e„j Órkon prokaloumšnJ oÙkšti de‹ ¢pèsasqai ƒkšthn.
116 See, contra, GAGARIN, 2005, p. 87 ff.
117 As for the particular context of the quarrel between the two heroes, in my opinion the verses 
are clear enough against Thür’s thesis: the dik£zein of Menelaus (regardless of its nature) seems 
to be a ‘deﬁnitive’ and ‘alternative’ judgment, since the dik£zein of the chiefs of the Argives is 
immediately replaced by the Menelaus’ one (and that means that the ‘¢moibhdˆj dik£zein’ men-
tioned in Hom., Il. 18.506 seems not to take place). Moreover, if one interprets the dik£zein of 
Menelaus in terms of a ‘Beweisurteil’, such as it is characterized by Thür (see, THÜR, 1996, p. 64), 
i.e. a judicial statement whose content provides (and it is not determined by) a formal and compel-
ling evidence procedure (for instance the swearing of an oath) as a proposal submitted together 
with other ‘Beweisurteile’ to someone’s acceptance, who would be this ‘someone’? I believe that 
Menelaus in Hom., Il. 23.579 f. is not the ﬁrst of many Achaean leaders who ‘propose an oath’ 
each by an interlocutory sentence; he is the only one who ‘orders an oath’ to resolve the dispute 
with Antilochus with a ‘deﬁnitive judgment’. An alternative interpretation, more conforming to 
Thür’s one, could be the following one: Menelaus is the ﬁrst that proposes in his interlocutory 
sentence a method of dispute-settlement; then all the other Greek leaders, in their subsequent 
interlocutory judgments, convinced by the oath already formulated, follow Menelaus’ ‘Beweisur-
teil’, without proposing further and different methods of settling.
118 See, on this issue, TALAMANCA, 1979, p. 116; GAGARIN, 1997, p. 131 f.; MAFFI, 2007, p. 
190 ff.
119 Hom., Il. 1.237-239: nàn aâtš min uŒej 'Acaiîn / ™n pal£mVj foršousi dikaspÒloi, 
o† te qšmistaj / prÕj DiÕj e„rÚatai … ; Od. 11.185-186: Thlšmacoj temšnea nšmetai kaˆ 
da‹taj ™saj / da…nutai, §j ™pšoike dikaspÒlon ¥ndr’ ¢legÚnein. As for the traditional 
view, see, among the others, GAGARIN, 1973, p. 85; HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 113, 179, 287; CAN-
TARELLA, 1979 a, p. 249; JANIK, 2000, p. 9; STOLFI, 2006, p. 32, 200; contra, see PELLOSO, 2012, 
p. 126 f.
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kaspÒloi as the board that ‘gives judgments’ do not realise that if the noun 
is formed similarly to a„pÒloj and boukÒloj, based on the verb pšlesqai 
(colere)120, then, in the same way as a goat-herd or a cattleman does not cre-
ate or distribute ‘goats’ and ‘oxen’, but protects his animals, the dikaspÒloj 
cannot be the one who protects his own judgments (unless one thinks that the 
Mycenaean king was even a sort of ‘clerk of the court’), but must be the one 
who protects the party that has (and exposes) well-founded reasons.
Once said that, it is also impossible to accept the reconstruction proposed 
by Havelock and Gagarin on the grounds of the analysis of further verses that 
can be considered a milestone in the development of the concept of d…kh to-
wards an abstract principle. A passage in the sixteenth book of the Iliad, also 
dedicated to the death of Patroclus and structured on the basis of the cycles 
on the death of Achilles, talks about Sarpedon as the king who ruled Lykia by 
means of d…kai and sqšnoj121: here, the juxtaposition of d…kai to the abstract 
noun sqšnoj, the context that seems to exclude a pure subjective connotation, 
the presumable recentness of the book, seem to me elements that can lead 
the interpreter to refer the mentioned d…kai to a ‘summa of legal principles 
which provide what is due and what is right’ (independently of the nature of 
law in Homer)122, rather than to simple ‘procedures’, or to ‘judgments’, or to 
the ‘justice’ itself123. Conversely, according to another interpretation that – at 
least in my opinion – has some merit, where the text says that Nestor perio…de 
d…kaj frÒnin ¥llwn (a case that is often considered similar to that of Sarpe-
don)124, no mention is made of the existence of Nestor’s ‘superior knowledge’ 
of frÒnij and d…kai (variously interpreted in the sense of law, of justice, of 
procedures, of judgments)125, but the king of Pylos (whom Telemachus ques-
120 See FRISK, 1963, sv. dikaspÒloj («Richter»); CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. d…kh («juge, qui 
rend des sentences»); contra, see LIDDELL, SCOTT, 1996, sv. dikaspÒloj, who connects -pÒloj 
with tele‹n.
121 Hom., Il. 16.541-543: ke‹tai Sarphdën Luk…wn ¢gÕj ¢spist£wn, / Öj Luk…hn e‡ruto 
d…kVs… te kaˆ sqšne ú: / tÕn d’ ØpÕ PatrÒklJ d£mas’ œgce c£lkeoj ”Arhj.
122 See OSTWALD, 1973, p. 677; CANTARELLA, 1979 a, p. 149; PENTA, 2000, p. 681; PELLOSO, 
2012, p. 133 f. 
123 See EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 59; GIOFFREDI, 1962, p. 73; GAGARIN, 1973, p. 85 f.; FRISCH, 
1976, p. 46; JANKO, 1990 (ad Hom., Il. 16.541-547); LO SCHIAVO, 1994, p. 32 nt. 21; YAMAGATA, 
1994, p. 70; JANIK, 2000, p. 22, 29.
124 See FRISCH, 1976, p. 49, cf. 46; CANTARELLA, 1979, p. 149 and nt. 41; CANTARELLA, 1985, p. 
218; LO SCHIAVO, 1994, p. 39; YAMAGATA, 1994, p. 63; contra, see PELLOSO, 2012, p. 134 f. nt. 72.
125 LIDDELL, SCOTT, 1996, sv. frÒnij: «(sc. Nestor) knows well the customs and wisdom 
above other men»; cf. WALTER MERRY, RIDDELL, MONRO, 1886 (ad Hom., Od. 3.244); contra, 
see EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 59, who believes that Nestor «kennt das Anrecht der anderen, er weiss, 
was ihnen zukommt», so that «beweist die pluralische Verwendung, daß an der konkreten Ur-
sprungsbedeutung noch festgehalten ist, so ist doch deutlich, daß in den konkreten d…kai das 
Abstraktum, die d…kh, schon beschlossen ist».
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tions on the death of Agamemnon) is described as an expert of the mind and 
of the sorts allotted to the other men. Finally, there are at least two passages 
that describe the nascent iter that shall lead d…kh to be identiﬁed as a principle 
(and for this reason, the version that tries to extract here even a vestige of pro-
cedural meaning is simply self-serving): in the ﬁrst one, Zeus is depicted as 
the punisher of those judges who banish d…kh from the ¢gor», by ‘kr…nontej 
skoli¦j qšmistaj’ (that is, when carrying out the regal activity of ‘Rechts-
ﬁndung’, they choose theo-physical rules or principles that, just and right if 
considered per se, do not match the case, and for that reason they make the 
qšmistej ‘wrong’ for the ﬁnal decision of the dispute)126; in the second one, 
126 Hom., Il. 16.384-388: æj d’ ØpÕ la…lapi p©sa kelain¾ bšbriqe cqën / ½mat’ Ñp-
wrinù, Óte labrÒtaton cšei Ûdwr / ZeÚj, Óte d» ·’ ¥ndressi kotess£menoj calep»nV, 
/ o‰ b…V e„n ¢gorÍ skoli¦j kr…nwsi qšmistaj, / ™k d d…khn ™l£swsi qeîn Ôpin oÙk 
¢lšgontej (on the role played by Zeus, see, paradigmatically, Hom., Od. 1.376-380, 3.132-
134, on which LLOYD-JONES, 1971, p. 2 ff., 28 ff.; moreover, in accordance with such a doctrine, 
see Hesiod., Op. 9, 221, 264, and, on the contrary, Hom., Il. 15.135-137). See, on these verses, 
GAGARIN, 1973, p. 86, who maintains that «the meaning ‘legal process’ is all that the context re-
quires», and that «there is no evidence to indicate that we should extend the meaning of d…kh to 
something approaching ‘abstract justice’ or even ‘lawful behavior’»; HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 137: 
«there is no need to look for a late or post-Homeric source; the only difference is that elsewhere 
the procedure is memorialized by describing how it is applied, whereas here it is recommended 
by describing what happens when it is not applied» (see, moreover, MITTICA, 1996, p. 193, 
who makes d…kh mean «serie di sentenze date di necessità conformemente a quelle originarie 
divine»): this reconstruction seems to be so ‘unilateral’ and ‘frivolous’ that the Homeric context 
itself can be invoked against such a trend; see, moreover, JANKO, 1994, ad Hom., Il. 16.386-388, 
who translates d…kh with «case». On the contrary, see GERNET, 1917, p. 23; LLOYD-JONES, 1971, 
p. 6, 166 (even if he seems to me too peremptory when assuming that the doctrines implied 
in these verses «are in fact perfectly consistent with the theology of the Iliad as a whole»); 
PAZDERNIK, 1976, p. 73; DICKIE, 1978, p. 97; YAMAGATA, 1997, p. 91; LÉVY, 1998, p. 78: these 
scholars, among the others, rightly point out the necessity to see here the mention of a ‘prin-
ciple’ (see, ﬁnally, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 132 f.). On the Hesiodic inﬂuences (see Hesiod., Op. 8 ff.) 
that these verses show, see WILLCOCK, 1984 (ad Hom., Il. 16.387); (while KRAFFT, 1963, p. 77, 
believes that the scenario is spurious, and, similarly, LATTE, 1968 a, p. 10, considers the picture 
as a hapax which has been later introduced in the original text). As regards the qualiﬁcation of 
the qšmistej in terms of ‘skolia…’, in my opinion, if one interprets these verses as a criticism 
directed by Homer to the contents themselves of the ‘theo-physical order’, this sounds com-
pletely wrong: the only target of such an attack is the kings-judges who with their judgments 
allow ungrounded or even phony claims, as well as reject well-founded defenses (for a criticism 
to the main interpretations of this noun with regard to such context, see PELLOSO, 2012, p. 91 f. 
and nt. 221). In other words, it is not the ‘justice per se’, but the ‘administration of justice’ as 
such that is censured by the poet: my interpretation is corroborated by the etymological mean-
ing of kr…nein, that is «séparer, choisir, trier, trancher, décider» (CHANTRAINE, 1977, sv. kr…nein; 
see, moreover, YAMAGATA, 1997, p. 90; FARAGUNA, 2007, p. 77), and by Schol. Hom., Il. 16.387 
b (o‰ b…V e„n ¢gorÍ skoli¦j kr…nwsi qšmistaj: o‰ kakîj kr…nontej skoli¦j poi»sousi 
qšmistaj); see, for a different approach to the issue, ROUSSEAU, 1996, p. 107 ff.; BOUVIER, 2003, 
p. 267; BLAISE, 2006, p. 121 f.
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Odysseus’ servant Eumeus reiterates the fil…a of the gods towards what is d…
kh, not towards the œrga scetli£, that is to say towards human behaviours that 
are a‡sima127 and conform with the gods’ will and the nature of the world128.
If, as a ﬁnal point, d…kh must be considered ﬁrst of all an ‘individual sphere’, 
a ‘subjective substantive situation’, something that is owed, a claim, a reason, 
a power, thence it is groundless to espouse toto coelo the thesis supporting 
the primary and more wide-spread procedural meaning of the word; likewise, 
it is not convincing to identify d…kh (as against the order of qšmij) with an 
interfamilial law, with a human law or with a potentially democratic law. Ac-
tually, contextual analysis does not provide grounds for such ‘objective’ in-
terpretations: ex post, therefore, the thesis that rests upon the use of the Indo-
European root *deik as a precursor of the basic idea of ‘boundary’129, or the 
opinion sustained by those who have stressed the subjectivity of d…kh turns 
out to be more persuasive130. In fact, I believe that this concept can be found 
in two further famous Hesiodic passages respectively celebrating the idealised 
king, and criticizing the corrupt kings131: according to the communes opinio-
nes, the noun d…kh, in its sense of either judgment or decision, or of content 
of a judgment, or of settlement, is opposed to qšmistej in its sense of ‘issues 
deduced into the process’, ‘legal cases’, ‘legal questions’, ‘law-sessions’132. 
127 See BIANCHI, 1969; HOROWITZ, 1975; GRIFFIN, 1986, p. 40.
128 Hom., Od. 14.80-84: œsqie nàn, ð xe‹ne, t£ te dmèessi p£resti, / co…re’: ¢t¦r si£louj 
ge sÚaj mnhstÁrej œdousin, / oÙk Ôpida fronšontej ™nˆ fresˆn oÙd’ ™lehtÚn. / oÙ mn 
scštlia œrga qeoˆ m£karej filšousin, / ¢ll¦ d…khn t…ousi kaˆ a‡sima œrg’ ¢nqrèpwn. 
See DICKIE, 1978, p. 96 f.: «there is still no justiﬁcation for taking d…kh there to mean ‘legal 
process’», since «is contrasted with scetli¦ œrga and associated with a‡sima œrga» (accord-
ingly, see GERNET, 1917, p. 23; EHRENBERG, 1921, p. 59; LLOYD-JONES, 1971, p. 166; FRISCH, 
1976, p. 46; LÉVY, 1998, p. 71, 78). All in all, Hom., Il. 16.388 and Od. 14.84 are both clear 
examples of the noun d…kh used as a ‘principle’; therefore, the verses themselves do not allow 
at all to assume that here d…kh is a «procedure for settling disputes» (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 85 f.; 
see, also HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 180: «the dike they also prefer is that procedure which preserves or 
restores propriety by peaceful adjustment of claims rather than indulging in ruthless or extrava-
gant behavior»); other authors, as already mentioned, like to add even Hom., Il. 16.541-542 and 
Od. 3.244 (see CANTARELLA, 1979 a, p. 149): but this solution seems to me, as already pointed 
out, partially unconvincing.
129 PALMER, 1950; BISCARDI, 1982, p. 354.
130 JAEGER, 1936-1954 = 2003; RUDHARDT, 1999; JELLAMO, 2005; PATTARO, 2005; for further 
remarks cf. PELLOSO, 2012, p. 129 ff., 139 ff.
131 See Hesiod., Theog. 85-86 (p£ntej ™j aÙtÕn Ðrîsi diakr…nonta qšmistaj / „qe…Vsi d…
kVsin); Op. 221 (dwrof£goi, skoliÍj d d…kVj kr…nwsi qšmistaj). On these verses see, 
amplius, PELLOSO, 2012, p. 131 ff.; see, moreover, Op. 35-36 (diakrinèmeqa ne‹koj / „qe…Vsi 
d…kVsin), where the dative ‘ptosis’ ‘„qe…Vsi d…kVsin’ may be interpreted, without a doubt, as 
meaning both ‘with just judgments’, and ‘for [the] founded reasons’.
132 See, paradigmatically, BLAISE, 2006, p. 121, who believes that «the dikai refer to a con-
crete activity, legal proceedings, and designate the proceedings themselves or the sentence that 
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However, while it is true that in the Homeric epos the word qšmistej is used 
only to describe authoritative acts whose source is the gods (not the parties in 
a dispute; not even the human judge), and that the ﬁrst sense of (dia)kr…nein 
is ‘to choose/to select’, the d…kai quoted in this two opposite situations may 
be certainly interpreted as the ‘reasons of the opponent parties’ (as included in 
the respective judicial acts): on the one hand, the just basileÚj shall always 
allow well-founded claims („qe‹ai: i.e. that proceed straight and ﬁnd justly 
their target), on the other hand, the corrupt one, through the violation or the 
misconstruction of the rules and the principles codiﬁed in the qšmistej, shall 
allow vexatious or simply unfounded claims (skolia…).
In short, the conceptual foundations of the Greek legal experience do not 
seem to draw on the judge and his authority, on the legal procedure and its rit-
uals, but, rather, on the individual and, from an eminently substantive point of 
view, on his or her complex set of rights, duties, powers and freedoms. Being 
part of a system, that is the ancient order of qšmij, at ﬁrst means entitlement to 
d…kai, i.e. to ‘substantive positions’; ‘procedures’ are just over-structural and 
secondary devices aimed at protecting the claims previously recognized to the 
members of the system as such: and this – even if often forgotten, misunder-
stood, overlooked – represents one of the most signiﬁcant lessons we can infer 
from early Greek epos.
7. On a recent critical review.
I hope the remarks developed in this paper may further improve and bet-
ter clarify the explanations I had already endeavoured to illustrate in a recent 
monograph which, under the title ‘Themis’ e ‘dike’ in Omero. Ai primordi del 
diritto dei Greci, is focused on the relation existing between ‘substance’ and 
is the result of them» (nt. 23), so that «two legal moments are distinguished: the king decides 
(diakr…nei) some themistes thanks to some straight (or crooked) dikai. Whatever its precise 
meaning may be, the word themistes, which derives from the same root as t…qhmi (‘to place’), 
refers to the idea of ﬁxedness, of established norms or decrees, while the plural dikai refers to 
an activity, the procedure through which the judge settles the dispute by deciding among the 
themistes». See, moreover, WEST, 1966 (ad Hesiod., Theog. 85-86); LATTE, 1968, p. 233 ff.; 
OSTWALD, 1973, p. 676; WEST, 1978 (ad Hesiod., Op. 221); VERDENIUS, 1985 (ad Hesiod., Op. 
9, 36, 221); GAGARIN, 1986, p. 22 and nt. 16, 34; VAN WEES, 1992, p. 34 nt. 44; HUBBARD, 1995, 
p. 164 nt. 8, 171; RUDHARDT, 1999, p. 32 ff. What is more, in Gagarin’s opinion (GAGARIN, 
1973, p. 89), d…kh, whose primeval meaning is thought to be «settlement», stands for «liti-
gation process, legal system, law, rule of law» in Hesiod., Op. 9, 192, 213, 217, 220, 249, 
256, 269, 275, 278, 279, 283. Actually, in the Works and Days d…kh reveals a multi-faceted 
semantic sphere (see GERNET, 1917, p. 16): it is a ‘principle’, even personiﬁed (Op. 9, 192, 
220, 256, 269); it is a ‘judgment’ (Op. 36); it is a ‘proceeding’ (Op. 39); it is a ‘sanction’ (Op. 
239, 249); in most cases it is obviously a ‘substantive subjective position’ (Op. 219, 221, 230, 
250, 254, 262, 264, 272).
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‘procedure’ in the Homeric poems133. And I also hope to have been able, if not to 
totally persuade Mafﬁ, at least to diminish the skepticism he did show, together 
with some gracious praise, in his review of my work (for instance, when he wri-
tes: «io non credo che il tentativo, condotto dall’A. con tenacia e intelligenza, 
di individuare un signiﬁcato unico, o anche soltanto prevalente, dei due termini 
studiati conduca a un risultato convincente»; or, again, when he writes «nem-
meno mi sembra che le interpretazioni proposte dall’A. forniscano un contributo 
signiﬁcativo al problema da cui aveva preso spunto la sua ricerca, cioè il rappor-
to fra ‘azione’ e ‘diritto soggettivo’»)134. Indeed, notwithstanding my reviewer’s 
authority, the criticisms put forward do not turn out to be strong enough to make 
me change my mind. In short, I will try to explain why.
Mafﬁ starts off this way: «lo stesso A. è costretto a riconoscere, come i suoi 
predecessori, che nei poemi omerici (nonché negli Inni omerici e in Esiodo, 
occasionalmente inclusi nella trattazione) themis e dike presentano una gam-
ma di signiﬁcati, se non inconciliabili, quanto meno difﬁcilmente riconducibi-
li a un denominatore comune». Actually, these sentences do not exactly sum-
marize my opinion, since I anyhow believe that – regardless of the undeniable 
polysemy that characterizes both concepts – a common and primeval semantic 
sphere can conceivably be retraced135. 
If I have not got Mafﬁ’s thought wrong, the following statement looks like an 
overestimation of the expected outcomes of the diachronic approach to Homer136, 
as well as an implicit adhesion to the by then outdated ‘amalgam-theory’137: «è … 
inevitabile, e nemmeno l’A. riesce ad evitarlo, tentare di spiegare i differenti sig-
niﬁcati e usi dei termini in questione collocandoli in una serie cronologica … che 
però non trova corrispondenza in un mutamento coerente e parallelo del quadro 
politico, economico e sociale riscontrabile nei poemi». In reality, it is not a ques-
tion of reconstructing all the data offered by Homer in a ‘coherent’ and ‘plain’ 
continuum (what would be a hubristic effort directed to an impossible result); it is 
a question of explaining (rationally, if and when possible) the Homeric ‘cultures’ 
in the light of the incontrovertible great amount of inconsistencies and contradic-
tions, poetic exaggerations and mythical motifs. Thus, before the ‘high majesty’ 
of the poems, the ‘humble historian’ either may maintain «that Homer’s ﬁctive 
universe remains immortal precisely because it never existed as such outside 
133 PELLOSO, 2012.
134 MAFFI, 2013.
135 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 139 ff.
136 See CANTARELLA, 2001 (with further bibliography); cf. CANTARELLA, 1994; NAGY, 1995; 
ERCOLANI, 2006, p. 56 ff. Actually, the presence in the poems of description of material and 
cultural elements being prior to the eight century B.C. cannot be even denied by RAAFLAUB, 
1997, 1998, 2006.
137 See, for instance, LONG, 1970; SNODGRASS 1974; SHERRATT 1990; THOMAS, 1994.
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the poet’s or poets’ fertile imagination(s) – in much the same way as Homeric 
language was a ‘Kunstsprache’ never actually spoken outside the context of 
an epic recital»138, or he may make an effort to disentangle periods and soci-
eties, institutions and customs, rules and procedures. In the way forward the 
latter goal, setting each single evidence in an acceptable historical processus 
– even though inexorably characterized by many gaps and lack of ﬂuid conti-
nuity – is indispensable, since otherwise «le informazioni … appiattite su un 
unico orizzonte temporale … si contraddicono al punto da costringere a negar 
loro valore storico»139. So, once let apart elements of fantasy (such as Odys-
seus’ tales of adventures, the description of Alcinous’ palace, or human-divine 
relations), exaggerations (such as the descriptions of the heroes’ weapons and 
their strength, or numbers and time frames), and all that aims at creating an ‘epic 
distance’ (such as omissions of more current times), I do not hesitate to repeat 
the following opinions. On the one hand, clear examples of the Bronze Age 
include the ‘bronze weapons’, the ‘boar’s tusk helmet’, the ‘use of chariots in 
battle’, whereas Priamus’ family and palace, as well as the use of siege machines 
on wheels reﬂected in the myth of the Trojan Horse, can be easily read as signs 
of the Dark Ages. On the other hand, the administration of justice by a ‘single-
judge court’ (such as Minos and Agamemnon) and the administration of justice 
by a ‘panel of judges’ (such as the court portrayed on Achilles’ shield, or the 
corrupted aristocrats that Hesiod blames) show inter se formal and substantial 
dissimilarities that lead – even if they do not force – to think of two antitheti-
cal paradigms of ‘legal procedure’, each likely corresponding to a precise and 
single dot in the time-line. All that said against the simplistic idea supporting 
a synchronic frame for the poems, I need to point out that, in my view, even 
regardless of any institutional and cultural shift, neither qšmij changes its mean-
ing (since, in the Homeric poems, it represents an ‘objective and undifferenti-
ated order’, the ideological sources of which are natural forces or supernatural 
ones)140; nor, apart from three (quite easily explicable) exceptions141, d…kh does 
so (since, in the Homeric poems, it stands for a ‘subjective position’, even if 
138 CARTLEDGE, 2001, p. 151.
139 CANTARELLA, 2001, p. 11.
140 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 70 f., 141 f.
141 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 132 ff. Thence, Mafﬁ assumes: «lo stesso A. non può fare a meno di 
riconoscere che, in determinati passi dei poemi omerici, dike assume un signiﬁcato diverso, 
irriducibile a quello da lui considerato predominante. Mi riferisco in particolare a Il. 16.541-42, 
in cui Sarpedonte viene esaltato ‘come re che preserva la Licia con dikai e sthenos’. Secondo 
l’A. qui sarebbe documentato l’avvio di un ‘processo di astrazione’ che conduce dal signiﬁcato 
di dike nel senso di spettanza all’emersione di dike nel senso di ‘principio di ‘giustizia’ (p. 133). 
Mi chiedo: in base a quali argomenti è possibile collocare questi diversi signiﬁcati in una serie 
cronologica?». I have already explained at lenght my point in PELLOSO, 2012, p. 133 f. and nt. 
72: so, it is deemed not necessary to return to this topic.
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its wide and multifaceted use presents more than a few nuances depending 
on the circumstances)142. To tell the truth, afterwards, I only believe that the 
‘role’ played by the qšmistej in legal procedure (together with the ideology 
of judicial power) is doomed to change143.
Mafﬁ, with regard to the topic just above mentioned, wonders: «chi ci dice 
che la decisione giudiziaria del wanax miceneo non potesse essere considerata 
in contrasto con l’ordine ‘teo-ﬁsico’? E, d’altra parte, visto che non sembrano 
esistere mezzi per impugnare una sentenza considerata ingiusta, o comunque 
non conforme all’ordine divino, che utilità poteva avere attribuire a qšmistej 
l’efﬁcacia di una ‘Rechtsﬁndung’ tutta umana?». Once made clear that qšmistej, 
in my reconstruction, can never be given the effectiveness of a ‘Rechtsﬁndung’, 
since they are just the content (that is ‘non-human rules’ foregoing both legal 
process and judgment) of the ‘kr…nein’ (that is human activity of ‘ﬁnding’ and 
‘selecting’, carried out during the process with a view to the judgment itself), I 
think that my interpretation may gain support from this simple element: only in 
Hesiod144 (and in Hom., Il. 16.384 ss.)145 the administration of justice is some-
times labeled as a crooked one, whereas in all the other Homeric verses attesting 
the noun qšmistej a monarchic legal procedure ﬁts the context better than an 
aristocratic one, no form of poetic disapproval appears, divine power is con-
stantly mentioned as basis and validation of human power (and, moreover, it 
must be remarked that such pictures convey an ideology and a theology of king-
ship much different from the Odyssey’s one)146. 
Mafﬁ, after recalling my deﬁnition of Homeric d…kh, that is «sotto il proﬁlo 
statico … ragione di parte, spettanza, posizione … sotto quello dinamico … pro-
cedura attivata per far valere una propria posizione o far riconoscere una posi-
zione altrui», goes on and states: «ora, a me pare che qui emerga una contrap-
posizione, se non una contraddizione, tra un’affermazione, appunto soggetti-
vistica, di una propria pretesa o spettanza, e il riconoscimento di una pretesa o 
di una posizione altrui». Actually such an opposition, or such a contradiction, 
can be appropriately supposed and rightly maintained with regard to a given 
historical or meta-historical reference background only if one has demonstrated 
in advance that a dichotomy exists between procedure and substance and, at the 
same time, that ‘action’ is an autonomous, formal, and abstract concept: without 
any former explanation, the criticism conceals an approach that interprets ancient 
sources with modern and contemporary categories (since the theorization of a 
legal system both based primarily on ‘substantive rights’ and made effective 
142 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 110 ff., 119 ff.
143 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 81.
144 See supra, p. 257 nt. 131 f. 
145 See supra, p. 256 nt. 126.
146 See, for instance, CARLIER, 1984, p. 195 ff.
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ex post through ‘legal procedures’, is the outcome of post-medieval specula-
tions)147. All in all, until otherwise proven, I have reason to keep on believing that, 
if «per i Romani era titolare dell’actio solo chi aveva ragione», since «chi afferma 
diritti o situazioni di fatto che non vengono riconosciuti sussistenti … non ha 
l’actio»148, likewise in the Homeric poems ‘one has d…kh, if he has d…kh’. What is 
more, the concrete example quoted by Mafﬁ to support his view does not seem to 
me appropriate, since the point is founded on a singularly curious, if not wrong, 
interpretation of Hom., Od. 9.215 (interpretation which, given its wording, could 
also be read as if it ascribed to me a thought that actually I never expressed): «che 
ad es. di Polifemo si dica che ‘non conosceva né d…kai né qšmistej’ … non im-
plica evidentemente che non conosceva le proprie ‘pretese’, ma che queste pretese 
non erano conformi a ciò che per le regole delle relazioni umane gli sarebbe spet-
tato». Provided that my ‘subjective interpretation’ of d…kh neither excludes that 
one can violate de facto another’s d…kh, nor implies that, when one rejects or ac-
cepts the existence of a d…kh, he is dealing just with his own d…kh, it is evident – at 
least to me – that the verse in question does not concern Polyphemus and his own 
claims: when reading it in its proper context, and once compared it with Hom., 
Od. 9.106, it is easy to realize, against Mafﬁ’s understanding, that here the sign 
d…kai stands just for human ‘subjective positions’, ‘reasons’, ‘rights’, ‘claims’, 
i.e. d…kai which Odysseus and his fellows are entitled to, and which the Cyclops 
does not ‘see’, i.e. does not ‘acknowledge’ (and this and only this is the meaning I 
presented in my monograph and I have repeated in this paper in contradiction with 
other ‘objective’ interpretations)149. 
Mafﬁ maintains: «se si ammette che … i poemi ci attestano un uso diversi-
ﬁcato in base ai contesti di questi termini chiave, non si potrà negare che d…kh 
ricorra anche nel signiﬁcato di ‘procedura di giustizia’ (lo stesso A. parla a p. 
149 della ‘permanenza di sfumature processualistiche’) o di ‘codice’ avente 
ad oggetto ‘modi di comportamento … comunemente accettati e pretesi’ (così 
Havelock, citato dall’A. a p. 136)». It was not my aim to deny such semantic 
shades overall (undoubtedly existing in more recent sources). In the light of 
many deﬁciencies identiﬁed in Havelock’s and Gagarin’s thesis, I just tried to 
propose an alternative explanation of the noun d…kh and I suggested to read its 
earliest attestations from a subjective (that is ‘not characterized by objective 
connotations’) and monistic (that is ‘not directed to distinguish substance and 
procedure’) point of view: in effect, the so called ‘procedural thesis’ fails to 
make clear how the semantics of d…kh developed step by step, it is quite con-
147 On the absence of a dichotomy between procedure and substance in ancient and medi-
eval world, ORESTANO, 1959 is still essential; for a further bibliography and a wider analysis of 
the so called ‘Problem of Action’, see, more recently, PELLOSO, 2011, p. 127 ff., 131 ff.
148 PUGLIESE, 1959, p. 27 f.
149 PELLOSO, 2012, p. 122 f. and nt. 42.
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fused in expounding the logical and historical link between d…kh and qšmij, 
it arbitrarily gives d…kh several meanings, either objective per se or tending 
towards an objective nuance (like ‘code’, ‘procedure’, ‘custom’, ‘behavior’), 
which could be straightforwardly replaced with one all-encompassing value 
(like ‘personal sphere’).
To conclude, I still have conﬁdence in the ﬁnal results of my work about early 
Greek epos and against the chronological and logical priority of procedure over 
substance. Indeed, the target has not been missed, even if I am persuaded that it 
may be helpfully adjusted: my explanation of d…kh is not contradicted by the Ho-
meric verses, it is further corroborated by etymology, it gets harmoniously along 
the objective interpretation proposed for qšmij, it is perfectly consistent and coher-
ent with a non-sophisticated culture which – as Mafﬁ must admit himself – «non si 
poneva certo un problema che presuppone un ordinamento giuridico progredito e 
complesso, quale si avrà in Grecia … non prima del V secolo a.C.».
Abbreviations
IG I3: Inscriptiones Graecae, I, Editio tertia, Decreta et Tabulae Magistratuum, cur. 
D. Lewis, Berlin, 1981.
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The Myth of the Priority of Procedure 
over Substance in the Light of 
Early Greek Epos
Abstract
Law can be shaped or considered in 
each of the two following ways: on the 
one hand, as a ‘system of rights’, so that 
actions are just the remedies created 
– on the subsidiary level of procedural 
law – to uphold them; on the other hand, 
as a ‘system of actions’, so that legal 
protection comes conceptually and op-
eratively before legal acknowledgment, 
since, if an action is made available, that 
means that simultaneously an implicit 
right is given. In the light of such a basic 
distinction, some general questions ipso 
iure arise on the ground of both ‘juris-
prudence’ and ‘history of ancient Greek 
legal systems’. Is it exact to assume that 
the above mentioned difference is only 
one of emphasis? Is it exact to suppose 
the chronological priority of procedural 
law over substantive law? Is it exact to 
consider the State and its legal process 
as the essential requirements to meet in 
order to consider a given system of rules 
a very legal system? As regards the legal 
concepts emerging from Homer and He-
siod, the communis opinio interprets the 
sign d…kh at ﬁrst as ‘settlement or deci-
sion between two parties’; consequently 
once he one assumes that the so called 
‘forms of actions’ are the primeval pil-
lars of the archaic Greek legal systems, 
and that the ‘judge’ (or better the ‘arbi-
ter’) is the prototype of the institutional-
ized creator of legal rules. Through the 
exegesis of early Greek epos, this article 
aims at demonstrating: the incorrectness 
Il mito della priorità della procedura
sulla sostanza alla luce
dell’epos greco arcaico
Riassunto
È possibile strutturare e concepire il di-
ritto oggettivo in due modi: da una par-
te, come un sistema di diritti soggettivi, 
di talché le azioni sono solo strumenti 
rimediali di natura processuale tesi a 
tutelarli; dall’altra, come un sistema di 
azioni, di talché la tutela giurisdiziona-
le precede concettualmente ed operati-
vamente il riconoscimento giuridico, in 
quanto, se un’azione è esperibile, ciò 
signiﬁca che al contempo un implicito 
diritto soggettivo è stato attribuito. Alla 
luce di questa fondamentale distinzio-
ne, sorgono ipso iure alcune domande 
che concernono tanto la teoria generale 
quanto la storia degli antichi ordina-
menti giuridici greci. È esatto ritenere 
che la sopraccennata differenza ha va-
lore solo formale? È esatto supporre la 
priorità cronologica e logica del diritto 
processuale su quello sostanziale? È 
esatto considerare lo Stato e il processo 
giurisdizionale quali indefettibili requi-
siti per un sistema, non di sole regole, 
ma propriamente normativo? Con ri-
guardo ai concetti giuridici che emergo-
no in Omero e in Esiodo, la communis 
opinio interpreta il segno d…kh in primo 
luogo come ‘risoluzione o decisione di 
una controversia tra due parti’; conse-
guentemente si assume che le ‘azioni’ 
rappresentino i primordiali pilastri de-
gli ordinamenti greci più antichi e che 
il ‘giudice’ (o, meglio, l’ ‘arbitro’) sia il 
prototipo del creatore istituzionale del-
le norme. Attraverso l’esegesi dell’epos 
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of the analysis that considers the antith-
esis between substance and procedure as 
a mere question of emphasis, and, above 
all, the original Greek monism (given 
that the opposite view, supporting the 
priority of procedure over substance, 
is just an anti-historical and aprioristic 
one, since it is deeply – perhaps uncon-
sciously – inﬂuenced by the so called 
Roman ‘aktionenrechtliches Denken’ 
and it is founded on a partisan reading 
of the sources).
Keywords: d…kh, substance, procedure, le-
gal procedure in Homer and Hesiod.
 
greco arcaico, questo articolo è volto a 
dimostrare la fallacia dell’analisi che 
ritiene l’antitesi tra sostanza e procedu-
ra come una questione di sola forma, e, 
soprattutto, l’originario monismo greco 
(atteso che la tesi opposta, in favore della 
priorità della procedura sulla sostanza, è 
antistorica e aprioristica, sia perché pro-
fondamente inﬂuenzata, benché in modo 
forse inconscio, dal cd. ‘aktionenrechtli-
ches Denken’ romano, sia perché basata 
su una lettura partigiana delle fonti). 
Parole chiave: d…kh, sostanza, procedura, 
processo in Omero ed Esiodo.
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